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Sygnity

SGN.WAWarsawPLNVertical software and IT servicesReviewed Nov 15, 2026

Software owner cash and disciplined acquisitions

8 of 11 research checks complete. Still to complete: Security and evidence base; Opportunities and funded scenarios; Variant view and catalysts · September 2026 reported earning-power bridge, cash and claims; October g.on pro forma

Maintain and develop critical software for regulated customers, then deploy surplus owner cash into independent software businesses. Project execution, employee economics and actual deal returns determine compounding.

  • Maintenance/implementation demand and organic versus acquired cash growth
  • Working capital, current cash tax, employee awards and reserve needs
  • Related-party pricing, target cash yields, actual deployment and minority rights
Inspect live quotes, sensitivity grid & cash-flow bridge

Scenario assumptions

Software owner cash and disciplined acquisitions · September 2026 reported earning-power bridge, cash and claims; October g.on pro forma

DriverDownsideBaseUpside
Common cash payout0.0%0.0%0.0%
Exit / after-financing owner cash11.41×15.71×15.71×
Net dilution beyond charged compensation0.0%0.0%0.0%
Available cash deployment fraction100.0%13.6%27.3%
Organic revenue growth
Year 1: -2.0%
Years 2–5: 0.0%
Year 1: 9.5%
Years 2–3: 7.0%
Years 4–5: 5.5%
Year 1: 13.0%
Years 2–3: 11.0%
Years 4–5: 9.0%
Owner-cash margin on organic revenue
Year 1: 24.8%
Years 2–5: 23.3%
Years 1–5: 24.8%
Years 1–2: 24.8%
Years 3–5: 25.3%
Price paid per unit of acquired revenue
Years 1–5: 1.06×
Years 1–5: 1.06×
Years 1–5: 1.06×
Owner-cash margin of acquired businesses
Years 1–5: 16.2%
Years 1–5: 16.2%
Years 1–5: 16.2%
Acquired revenue growth after purchase
Years 1–5: 0.0%
Years 1–2: 0.0%
Years 3–5: 3.4%
Years 1–2: 0.0%
Years 3–5: 3.4%
Deal budget (capital available for acquisitions)
Years 1–3: 0.00
Years 4–5: 14.02
Year 1: 26.29
Year 2: 27.19
Year 3: 28.11
Year 4: 29.07
Year 5: 30.06
Year 1: 35.74
Years 2–3: 44.20
Years 4–5: 58.40
  • Downside case. Project/organic cash growth and the acquisition pipeline stall. Retain cash at face value; an 11.5x exit (zero-growth value at the market cost of equity, averaged with the 2022 trough). No separate permanent margin haircut is silently added.
  • Base case. 6.51% through-cycle organic owner-cash growth, deal spending starting at the observed FY2025 pace and growing 3.4% a year (flat deal count), the family 6.61x purchase price, and a 16x Koller exit at a 10.45% market cost of equity. No new borrowing or free buyback accretion.
  • Upside case. 11.0% organic growth and twice the base deployment fraction, growing 15% a year. Same purchase price and the same 16x exit: no extra re-rating or cheap-deal uplift.

Research notebook

Reviewed Nov 15, 2026

8 of 11 research checks complete. Still to complete: Security and evidence base; Opportunities and funded scenarios; Variant view and catalysts
Business model

Researched 27 October 2026; economic engine, unit economics and history rebuilt from five years of filings on 3 November 2026. Money is PLN millions unless stated. Source IDs refer to sources/registry.json, fact IDs to financials/facts.json, and named calculations to valuation/calculations.json.

Sygnity builds, implements and services software for the Polish state, the central bank, banks, utilities and, since 2024, a few acquired product niches. Accounting, payment, welfare, labour-market and billing workflows run on systems Sygnity wrote, which gives a reason to keep paying the incumbent. Regulation and changes in customer processes create development work. Switching means migration, retraining, testing and operational risk; it remains possible, and public tenders can be lost.

The fiscal year moved from October–September to the calendar year: FY2020/21 and FY2021/22 end in September, FY2022/23 ran 15 months to December 2023, and 2024 onward are calendar years. Calendar 2021 and 2022 below are derived from the audited fiscal years and the Q1 interim reports; calendar 2023 is the audited comparative column (revenueCY2021–revenueCY2023 and the matching cash facts).

Value-creation mechanism

Sygnity's value comes from owning the code and domain knowledge of systems that a ministry, the central bank or a distribution utility cannot easily replace. The incumbent then gets most of the multi-year maintenance and change-request work on those systems: 48-month renewals across six Ministry of Family systems in 2024 (pracaGovContractMax and the PWI, AC and ZC contracts, sgn-fy24-report pp.32-33), and two annexes taking the NBP accounting-system contract to PLN135m gross for 2024–2027, the second "due to an increase in the Employer's needs" (sgn-nbp-contract). The work is paid largely in advance or on delivery and needs almost no capital, so owner cash is close to after-tax operating profit.

Since TSS Europe (Topicus, in the Constellation family) took control in 2022, two more steps were added: reprice and prune the franchise, then send the surplus cash into small vertical-software companies. Most of the value so far came from the repricing step, not from acquisitions. Between calendar 2021 and 2025, NOPAT rose by 44.8 (nopatChangeWindow). Deals explain about 8.5–13.6 of that: the 2024 deals' annualized profit or cash proxy of 6.7–11.8 (deals2024AnnualProfit, deals2024CashProxy), plus DocLogix and one month of Mednow. The remaining 31–36 came from the existing business, while working capital released 24.8 of cash (workingCapitalReleasedWindow). The repricing was a one-time step that is now largely complete. The forward mechanism has to be margin retention against wage inflation, plus deployment of cash that otherwise sits idle.

Business-model profile

Comparable firms are chosen by these traits, not by the industry label.

Growth vehicle: Mixed: organic and acquisitions. Revenue rose from 205.9 in 2021 to 350.3 in 2025. Companies bought in 2024–2025 contributed roughly 51 of 2025 revenue (Edrana, Sagra, DocLogix, Mednow at their run rates), so the organic base grew by about 80 over the period, with negative net capital. Deals began only in 2024 under the current owner and were 8.0% of revenue over 2023–2025. The model grows the organic base and adds deals at measured entry yields, on a record of only two active deal years.

Capital intensity: 0.6% of sales, asset-light. Capital spending is about 0.6% of revenue: computers and offices for software engineers. Tangible capital is negative (−24.3 in 2025) because customers prepay and staff costs are billed promptly. Growth needs people and, since 2024, acquisition cash (8.0% of revenue over 2023–2025).

Comparables. A comparable firm writes and maintains mission-critical software for government, central-bank, banking and utility customers, earns from long implementation and maintenance relationships, needs almost no fixed capital, and has recently started bolt-on acquisitions. Its revenue depends on the timing of public procurement. Not the label: "IT services" suggests consulting priced by the hour; Sygnity owns the systems its customers run and earns product-like maintenance margins.

Declared in valuation/model.json (businessProfile). npm run check measures deal and capital intensity from the reported facts, and the outside view grades the forecast only against firms that share them.

Economic snapshot

Calendar 2025 (audited) unless stated; calculations named in brackets.

MeasureValueDefinition
Revenue (revenue2025)350.3+19.5% on 2024; about 14% excluding businesses bought in 2025 (sgn-presentation)
Gross margin46.5% (FY to Sep 2022: 28.5%)gross profit / revenue (grossMargin2025, grossMarginFY2022)
EBIT margin25.5% (FY2022: 12.0%)statutory operating profit (ebitMargin2025)
EBIT before acquisition amortization96.7 (27.6%)plus 7.2 amortization of acquired intangibles (ebitBeforePpa2025)
Incremental EBIT margin39.7% (2024→2025)ΔEBIT 22.7 / Δrevenue 57.1 (incrementalMargin2025)
Trailing June 2026 EBIT106.0 (26.2% of 405.3)FY2025 + H1 2026 − H1 2025 (sgn-h126 p.9)
Operating working capital−38.5receivables 44.7 + contract assets 17.8 + contract costs/inventory 1.3 − trade and other liabilities 61.0 − contract liabilities 41.3 (operatingWorkingCapital2025)
Receivable / contract-liability days65 / 43(receivables + contract assets) / revenue; customer prepayments / revenue
PP&E / right-of-use assets5.5 / 8.6
Tangible capital including leases−24.3working capital + PP&E + ROU (tangibleCapital2025)
Return on tangible capital (leases capitalized) and ROCE (leases expensed)not meaningfulcapital is negative under both definitions: customers and employees fund the business
Return on capital including goodwill and acquired intangibles34.1% after tax (36.8% before acquisition amortization)NOPAT 72.5 at 19% / 212.6 (returnOnCapitalIncGoodwill2025)
Same, excluding goodwill from mergers before 2024131%72.5 / 55.5 (recentCapital2025); 157.2 of goodwill dates from the EMAX and Polsoft era
Debt / leases / cash0 bank debt (last 12.0 loan repaid in 2025), bond 0.1 / leases 9.2 / cash 187.7 (225.1 at June 2026)sgn-fy25 p.6, sgn-h126
Revenue / EBIT per average FTE0.407 / 0.104 (FY2022: 0.309 / 0.037)860 FTE in 2025, 752 of them in implementation (revenuePerFte2025)

Normalization before returns: capex (1.8) was below own-asset D&A (2.6 = 13.96 total − 4.10 right-of-use − 7.24 acquisition amortization), so maintenance spending is not understated in a way that matters at this scale. There are no minorities. Mednow is in the 2025 accounts for one month only, and the model adds its missing months separately. Cash tax is the main normalization: 2025 tax paid was 8.6 against 18.2 of current tax, because loss carry-forwards ran out (no tax losses remained at June 2026, sgn-h126 note 12.3; H1 2026 paid 24.3). The model charges current tax. The effective rate of 14.9% reflects the IP-box regime, so returns at the 19% statutory rate are slightly conservative.

Economic segmentation

Sygnity reports one IT segment (sgn-fy25 note 7). Its management report gives revenue by customer sector, and the revenue note splits servicing from implementation. Neither split is a profit split. Re-cut by how value is created:

Economic unitRevenue evidenceProfit evidenceDemand driverCharacter
Public-administration franchise (Ministry of Family welfare and labour systems, Poczta Polska ZST, police CSD)96.9 in 2024 (33%); FY2022 87.7 on 98 projects (sectorPublic2024, sectorPublicFY2022)not disclosedstatutory programme changes, EU-funded digitization, 48-month maintenance renewalsrecurring core, with tender risk on new builds
Central-bank and financial-market franchise (NBP ZSK accounting, brokerage and depository systems, bank reporting)84.8 in 2024 (29%); FY2022 69.8not disclosedregulation (NBP, KNF, KDPW), bank IT budgetsrecurring; NBP alone is up to about 27/yr net under its 2024–2027 contract
Utilities billing and metering (PGE multiZBYT, SUD, AMS)64.5 in 2024 (22%); FY2022 48.0not disclosedenergy-market regulation: Solidarity Shield price caps (2023 act), CSIRE data hub, balancing rulesrecurring base plus regulation-driven waves; part of the growth is cyclical
Acquired product companies (Sagra retail SaaS, Edrana ERP Baltics, DocLogix, Mednow hospital IT, g.on Germany)retail 20.0 in 2024 (Sagra about 90%); about 51 of 2025 revenue (estimate from the 2024 run rates plus the 2025 contributions)roughly 15 of about 111 portfolio owner cash, about 13%: Edrana 2.3 and Sagra 4.3 annualized net profit, DocLogix about 0.8, plus model proxies of 0.5 for Mednow's missing months and 4.7 for g.oncustomer vertical demand; SaaS and maintenancesmall, growing by purchase

Across revenue streams, 2025 servicing was 144.2 (41%, +27% on 2024), implementation 189.0 (54%, +13%) and licences 15.8 (4.5%) (sgn-fy25 note 9). "Implementation" includes change requests on Sygnity's own installed systems, which behave like recurring development rather than one-off projects. The NBP annex is development work added to a maintenance contract.

Conclusions. Revenue share by sector says nothing about profit share, and the issuer does not disclose sector margins, so we do not allocate profit among the three franchises. About 87% of owner cash still comes from the incumbent franchises and about 13% from acquired businesses. Utilities grew fastest from FY2022 to 2024 (48.0 to 64.5, +34%) during the Solidarity Shield and CSIRE adaptation wave. Up to about 16 of revenue, perhaps 6–7 of EBIT at the group's incremental margin, may be regulation-timed rather than permanent.

Unit economics

The unit through which Sygnity adds value is the installed-system relationship, and the intervention that mattered is TSS's ownership since 2022. The before-and-after comparison is therefore the whole incumbent business per delivery employee, FY to September 2022 (the last year before TSS's influence) against calendar 2025. Contracts are not costed separately in public filings.

Per average FTE (PLN thousand)FY2022 (685 FTE)2025 (860 FTE)Change
Revenue309407+32%
Subcontractors and other third-party services94 (30.4% of revenue)88 (21.6%)lower in money as well as share
Payroll and benefits159 (51.5%)191 (46.9%)+20%; average pay at the parent rose from 123 (FY2021) to 168
D&A16162025 includes acquired-intangible amortization
Gross profit88189×2.1
EBIT37104×2.8
Tangible capitalnegativenegativeprepayments and payables exceed receivables

The levers were pruning and price, not buying power. Projects fell from 538 (FY2021) to 397 over the 15 months to December 2023 (projectsFY2021, projectsFY2023), while revenue per public-sector project rose from 0.89 (FY2022) to 1.17 (2024). The share of subcontracted work fell by about 9 points of revenue. Revenue per head rose faster than pay. mBank's October 2024 note records management's aim of winding down projects with insufficient profit (sgn-mbank-2024).

A representative maintenance unit: the Praca.gov.pl contract (November 2024) has a 48-month maximum of 14.2 gross, about 11.5 net of VAT, or 2.9 a year. At the 2025 group revenue per implementation FTE of 0.466, that is roughly six people. At the group's 2025 cost structure it would earn about 0.7–0.8 of EBIT a year on no tangible capital. This is an illustration from group averages, not a disclosed contract margin. The large unit is NBP: up to 135 gross (about 110 net) over 2024–2027, roughly 27 a year, or 7–8% of 2025 revenue.

Acquired companies are the second unit (edranaNetPrice … sagraAnnualProfit):

Edrana Baltic (Feb 2024)Sagra Technology (Mar 2024)
Price net of acquired cash9.437.6
Revenue, annualized from 11 / 10 months14.926.3
Net profit, annualized2.3 (16%)4.3 (16%)
Price / net profit4.0x8.7x
Purchase-price intangibles11.340.7
Tangible capital acquiredreceivables 1.7, no material PP&Ereceivables 2.2, PP&E 0.6

The two together cost 4.0x–7.1x a cash proxy, depending on whether the reported contributions bear purchase-price amortization (deals2024LowerMultiple, deals2024UpperMultiple). Their returns are entry yields, not post-integration results.

Failure case: e-Taxes. Sygnity won the Ministry of Finance e-Taxes system in 2013 on a fixed-price tender and subcontracted much of it to Fast Enterprises. The resulting court disputes ran for years, through the period of the 2018 creditor restructuring, and in February 2021 Sygnity settled by paying USD3.75m (about PLN14m) into deposit (fastEnterprisesSettlement, sgn-fy21-report p.24). The levers failed because, on a new-build tender where price decides, Sygnity carried subcontractor and scope risk without incumbency. The same exposure remains wherever Sygnity bids for greenfield public systems (sgn-fy24-report p.55).

Parent against subsidiaries, H1 2026 (added 3 November). The parent company is the organic franchise. In H1 2026 it earned a core operating margin (gross profit less selling and G&A) of 32.6% on 135.9 of revenue, up from 26.1%. The subsidiaries (SBS, Edrana, Sagra, DocLogix, Mednow), together with consolidation entries, earned about 9.9 of pretax on about 77.6 of revenue, roughly 13%, after acquisition amortization. The acquired units therefore run at well under half the parent's margin. Mednow's KPO hospital projects added revenue faster than profit: subsidiary over-time revenue rose +35.8 against a pretax gain of +3.9 (02-history.md). The repricing mechanism described above is a parent-company phenomenon. It has not been shown in the acquired companies, whose results are not reported separately.

Independent checks

  1. Cash against accounts. Derived owner cash, after capex, leases, interest and award cost (ownerCashCY2025), was 104.4 in 2025 against NOPAT of 72.5 at 19%. The gap is explained by 14.1 of working-capital release, cash tax 9.6 below current tax, and non-cash acquisition amortization of 7.2. The normalized June-trailing bridge removes the first two and gives 94.6 (normalizedTrailingOwnerCash). The unit view, high margin on negative capital, matches the group cash record: 2021–2025 growth released net capital (totalCapitalDeployedWindow is only 64.9 including 70.1 of deals).
  2. Outside forecasts as a test of the consensus model. In October 2024 mBank forecast 2025 EBIT of 56.2 (17.6% margin) and net profit of 48.2, with a sell rating and a PLN39 target at PLN58 (mbankEbit2025Forecast). Actual 2025 EBIT was 89.5 and net profit 77.3. The consensus treated Sygnity as a tender-driven integrator with a stable margin. The repricing seen in the per-FTE table is what it missed.
  3. Adverse allocation. Give the deals the most favourable reading: the 11.8 cash proxy for the 2024 deals, plus 0.8 for DocLogix and 1.0 for Mednow's December, is 13.6 of NOPAT. The existing business still produced at least 31.2 of the 44.8 NOPAT increase from 2021 to 2025 (70%) while releasing capital. Then treat all utilities growth since FY2022 (+16.4 of revenue) as temporary regulatory work at the 39.7% incremental margin. That removes about 6.5 of EBIT (7% of 2025), but the conclusion that the incumbent franchise was repriced survives.
  4. Peer check. Asseco Poland, the largest Polish software house and a competitor in public and banking IT, trades at about 24x trailing earnings on an aggregator's 28 October 2026 figure (asseco-pe-aggregator; not reconciled to filings). No peer filings were read for margins, so the per-FTE comparison is internal only.

Where the consensus may still disagree: the market may treat 2025–2026 margins as the new normal. We treat them as the result of a one-time repricing whose durability depends on renewals and wage inflation. The H2 2026 and H1 2027 EBIT margins will settle it (prospective checks).

No fieldwork was done: no customer, employee or competitor interviews. Statements by management are evidence of what management says.

Sources: sgn-fy21, sgn-fy21-report, sgn-fy22, sgn-fy22-report, sgn-fy23, sgn-fy23-report, sgn-fy24, sgn-fy24-report, sgn-fy25, sgn-h126, sgn-q121, sgn-q122, sgn-presentation, sgn-nbp-contract, sgn-mbank-2024, asseco-pe-aggregator, sgn-asseco-h126.

History, market & cycle

Sygnity's history includes the ComputerLand/EMAX combination, the e-Taxes dispute and a 2018 creditor restructuring that was only completed in June 2021 (sgn-fy22 p.8 note). Its current economics should not be inferred only from the recovery off that distressed base. TSS Europe bought 72.68% in a 2022 tender at PLN12 a share (tssCallPrice, sgn-tss-call), which made Sygnity an acquisition platform inside the Topicus/Constellation family. Group affiliation brings experience and deal flow. It does not guarantee returns to minority shareholders.

Acquisitions since then: Edrana Baltic (February 2024), Sagra (March 2024), DocLogix (July 2025), Mednow, formerly Comarch HIS (December 2025), and g.on (October 2026, from TSS). Closing dates matter. DocLogix is fully in the trailing June 2026 window, Mednow for seven months, g.on not at all. A newly bought company's full-year earnings cannot simply be added on top of its already consolidated contribution.

The model uses calendar windows: FY2025 + H1 2026 − H1 2025, provisionally rolled to September with the 2 November preliminary release. The 2025 presentation's revenue bridge suggests about 14% growth excluding businesses bought in 2025. Some chart sub-bars do not add to their headline, so the numerical ledger uses statutory tables. The latest full statements are for H1 2026; the Q3 report is due 10 November 2026, and no Q3 actuals are invented.

Demand drivers and cycle

Who decides and who pays:

CustomerEnd userPayerDecision-maker
Ministries and agencies (welfare, labour market, foreigners' permits)civil servants, labour offices, citizensstate budget, often EU or KPO co-financingthe ministry's IT department and procurement under public-procurement law
NBP (central bank)accounting and back-office staffNBPNBP IT; renewals and annexes rather than open retenders
Distribution and sales utilities (PGE group)billing and metering staffthe utility, which passes costs into regulated tariffsutility IT, under deadlines set by the regulator (URE, PSE)
Banks, brokers and depositoriesoperations staffbank IT budgetbank IT and compliance, driven by KNF, KDPW and exchange rules
Acquired niches (retailers, Baltic ERP users, hospitals, airports)the business userthe customerthe owner or CIO

Demand splits into four parts:

  • Replacement and maintenance: servicing revenue, 144.2 in 2025 (41%).
  • Regulation-driven development: change requests forced by law. Examples are the 2023 electricity price-cap act (Solidarity Shield), the CSIRE energy data hub, PSE balancing rules and labour-market reforms (sgn-fy24-report pp.32-34).
  • Discretionary new systems: tenders.
  • Product sales in acquired niches.

Measured cycle (calendar revenue, revenueCY2020–revenue2025): 218.7, 205.9, 219.1, 229.3, 293.2, 350.3. Revenue fell 6% in 2021, while projects were being pruned and the e-Taxes settlement closed. Servicing went from 75.0 (FY2021) and 75.6 (FY2022) to 70.6 a year over the 15-month FY2023, then to 113.8 in 2024 and 144.2 in 2025. H1 2026 servicing was 96.6 against 66.6 a year earlier, partly from acquisitions. The franchise has not shown a cyclical collapse. A test of public IT budgets through a recession is unavailable, because the 2020 shock coincided with Sygnity's own restructuring. We did not obtain a series of Polish public IT spending or EU-fund disbursement, which is the series that would measure the public-sector cycle.

Market misperception and the series that tests it. In 2023–2024 the sell-side saw a tender-driven integrator with a stable mid-teens margin: mBank forecast 17.6% EBIT for 2025 (sgn-mbank-2024). The actual margin was 25.5%. The belief was refuted by the reported EBIT margin and the rising servicing share, which are published every half-year. The present risk is the opposite misreading: treating regulation-timed utility work and the post-repricing margin as permanent.

Growth decomposition, 2024 to H1 2026 (added 3 November 2026)

Sygnity reports one segment. The parent company's separate statements (Sygnity S.A., which holds none of the acquired businesses) isolate the organic core, and IFRS 15 timing separates long projects from the rest. PLN m:

H1 2024H1 2025H1 2026H1 2026 vs H1 2025
Group revenue131.4158.4213.5+55.0 (+34.7%)
Parent products and services (organic)99.6116.1135.5+19.5 (+16.8%)
of which parent maintenance35.741.451.1+9.7 (+23%)
of which parent implementation60.770.581.2+10.7 (+15%)
Subsidiaries and eliminations (group less parent)about 3241.877.6+35.8
Group revenue recognized over time15.520.567.1+46.5
of which subsidiaries—6.342.1+35.8
Group revenue at a point in time115.9137.9146.4+8.5
of which subsidiaries—35.535.50.0
Licences / hardware4.7 / —6.7 / 0.510.8 / 1.3subsidiaries' licences +4.9

Sources: sgn-h126 pp.17, 44-45; sgn-h125 p.16; facts parentRevenueH12024 … pointInTimeH12026.

Quarterly over-time revenue was 11.3, 9.2, 13.9, 21.7 (2025), then 17.5 and 49.5 (Q1 and Q2 2026). Servicing was 30.8, 35.8, 36.0, 41.6, then 47.8 and 48.8.

What drives it:

  • Organic core. The parent grew 13.4% in 2025 (221.5 to 251.3) and 16.5–16.8% in each first half since 2024. Maintenance grew 17% in 2025 and 23% in H1 2026. The parent drove most of the profit: pretax excluding intra-group dividends rose from 32.3 to 46.2 (+13.9), and its core operating margin from 26.1% to 32.6%. Subsidiaries added only +3.9 of pretax (subsidiaryPbtIncreaseH1).
  • Acquired, and a deadline wave inside it. All of the subsidiaries' +35.8 of revenue growth is over-time project revenue; their point-in-time revenue was flat at 35.5. It comes from Mednow (ex-Comarch HIS, consolidated from December 2025) and DocLogix (from July 2025). In Q1 2026 Mednow signed nine hospital contracts for its OPTIMED NXT system under the KPO recovery plan, worth 22.8 gross (sgn-q126 pp.33-34). The Ministry of Health requires those projects to be physically completed by 15 July 2026, with spending eligible to 31 August 2026 (kpo-d112-schedule). This is the structure SII flagged: a 2.3x jump in over-time revenue and a −19% fall in point-in-time revenue in Q2 (sii-2q26). We estimate the KPO wave added about 3.2 of pretax in H1 and about 3.8 of owner cash over the trailing year (kpoWaveOwnerCash), with a range of about 3–8. The wave ends after August 2026.
  • Servicing. Of the +30.0 servicing increase in H1, +9.7 is parent maintenance, which is organic. The remaining +20.3 is in subsidiaries: Mednow's hospital maintenance and DocLogix are new to the scope, but their split is not disclosed. SII's point that scope changes don't explain the jump is therefore partly answered (a third is organic) and partly open.
  • Price versus volume. This can't be separated from the disclosures. Group revenue per FTE was flat in 2025 (0.416 to 0.407 including acquisitions) and parent average pay rose 5.3%, so 2025 growth was mainly volume and scope. Renewals are being signed at higher ceilings (NBP +25 gross; the Ministry of Family SR/SW renewal at 4.9 gross for 24 months).
  • Sectors (H1 2025 vs H1 2024). Public +28% (57.7 vs 45.2), banking +16%, utilities −8% (29.2 vs 31.6) as the Solidarity Shield and CSIRE wave faded, and retail (Sagra) 12.3 (sgn-h125 p.21). H1 2026 sector figures are not published: the H1 2026 report has no management-report sales table.

Funding and the timing of demand

  • EU recovery funds (KPO/RRF). The direct exposure is Mednow's hospital work, ending 31 August 2026. Asseco is the larger hospital-software vendor (healthcare revenue 217 against Comarch e-health's about 50 in 2024, itwiz-comarch-his). We found no other Sygnity contract described as KPO-funded.
  • Cohesion funds (2021–2027). We found no Sygnity contract linked to them.
  • Polish budget IT spending. The core is statutory ministry systems financed from the state budget, not EU funds. The tender aggregator lists 37 public awards to Sygnity S.A. worth 195 gross from January 2025 to July 2026, mostly Ministry of Family maintenance and development: WUP-Viator 7.9, CAS 8.4, SR/SW 4.9 and Mazowieckie eDOKweb (mimira-awards, secondary, not reconciled). We did not obtain budget-law line items for 2026–2027, so the budget cycle remains unmeasured.
  • Backlog. Sygnity has published no order backlog (portfel zamówień) in the reports reviewed for 2021–2026.
  • Q3 report date. The issuer's 2026 calendar and current report 29/2026 give 10 November 2026; the 12 November shown by TipRanks and Investing is wrong.

Verdict: the 2025–2026 level is mostly new and durable at the parent (statutory maintenance and development, +17–23% maintenance growth), plus a temporary KPO hospital wave inside the acquired Mednow that ends in Q3 2026. The model removes the wave from starting earnings and raises base growth to the through-cycle organic rate (07-assumption-register.md).

Competition

Competition happens in two places. At tender, for a new system, Sygnity faces the leading Polish integrators (Asseco Poland above all), international IT firms and consultancies, and price is often decisive (sgn-fy24-report p.55; sgn-mbank-2024). On an installed system, competition is weak. The incumbent owns the code, the domain staff and the operational history, so renewals and change requests usually come to Sygnity by annex or extension. Examples are the NBP annexes, six 48-month Ministry of Family contracts in 2024 and Poczta Polska's two-year maintenance renewal (23.6 gross).

Advantage in one sentence: Sygnity owns the knowledge and code of systems that the state, the central bank and utilities cannot switch without risking service continuity, so it captures the maintenance and regulatory change work on them. Evidence that this is durable is limited to contract continuity in the filings. We found no lost renewal of a major system in 2021–2026, but the filings would not necessarily disclose one, and we did no customer interviews.

Competitor count: the issuer expects consolidation among the largest players and more foreign entrants (sgn-fy24-report p.55). Topicus, which controls Sygnity, also owns about 24.8% of Asseco Poland: 9.99% bought from Cyfrowy Polsat, plus 14.84% of treasury shares at PLN85 closed on 1 October 2025 under a shareholders' agreement with Adam Góral (topicus-asseco). Sygnity's controller is therefore a large holder in its main competitor. That may soften head-to-head price competition, but it also gives TSS a choice of vehicle for Polish deals and talent. Comarch, which began a strategic-options review in January 2025, sold its hospital-software unit (Comarch HIS) to Sygnity in December 2025 (itwiz-comarch-his), so one competitor exited one niche. Share of the Polish IT market is not measured here.

The competitor that could hurt Sygnity is Asseco Poland. It has the scale and public-sector references to underbid when a ministry or NBP retenders a core system or replaces it in an EU-funded modernization. It hasn't done so visibly, because the customer bears the migration risk, and because the state's in-house IT centres, not rival vendors, are the more likely route to replacing outsourced maintenance. That second path is a hypothesis we have not tested.

Counterparty incentives

CounterpartyWhat they wantWhat Sygnity gives themTheir outside optionsWhat would change the arrangement
TSS Europe / Topicus / Constellation (72.68% owner)high-return deployment of cash into vertical software, long holding periodsa listed CEE platform with surplus cash, local M&A capacity and a profitable franchisebuy out minorities (the 2022 call reserved a future delisting "if an opportunity arises"); route CEE deals to other TSS units; sell group assets to Sygnitya cheap price relative to value (buyout), or TSS needing a home for assets it owns
Ministries and agenciesuninterrupted statutory services at a defensible pricecontinuity, domain staff, fast regulatory changesretender (public-procurement law), insource to state IT centres, replace in EU-funded programmesprice rises that attract audit scrutiny, a failed delivery, a political push for state-owned IT
NBPreliable accounting and back-office systemslong-standing system knowledgeretender at the end of 2027delivery failure or a platform change
Utilitiescompliance with regulatory deadlinesbilling and metering systems already adaptedother billing vendors, group ITconsolidation of utility IT platforms
Employees (the scarce input)pay, stability, careerpay up 37% per FTE 2021→2025 at the parent; incentive plan for up to 149 managersother IT employerswage inflation above price increases

Dependence runs both ways. A ministry depends on Sygnity for systems it cannot easily rebuild. Sygnity depends on renewals that can be contested by tender. TSS gives discipline and deal flow but can also extract value: g.on came from TSS for EUR7.2m, about 1.5% of market value, with no stand-alone financials disclosed. TSS had flagged it four times since 2022 (current reports 40/2022, 25/2023, 9/2024, 15/2024; sgn-gon). Headlines about a counterparty's action show what it did, not why. We have no evidence of TSS's motive in the g.on sale beyond the stated strategy.

Sources: sgn-tss-call, sgn-fy21-report, sgn-fy22, sgn-fy22-report, sgn-fy23-report, sgn-fy24-report, sgn-fy25, sgn-h126, sgn-nbp-contract, sgn-gon, sgn-mbank-2024, sgn-presentation, sgn-calendar.

Management & incentives

Two layers decide where Sygnity's cash goes. The six-person management board runs operations and proposes deals. TSS Europe (Topicus, in the Constellation family) owns 72.68%, appoints the supervisory-board majority and sets the capital-allocation frame. The model uses all 22,759,947 issued shares (unchanged since 2019) and charges award cost once. Money in PLN.

Ownership and incentives

HolderShares (3 Sep 2026)Value at PLN942025 payHow acquiredBackground
TSS Europe B.V.16,542,399 (72.68%)1,555m—2022 tender at PLN12 (about PLN199m)Topicus/Constellation vertical-software acquirer
Barca Global Master Fund2,050,679 (9.01%)193m—marketfund
Maciej Różycki, CEO since May 202240,5383.8m2.33m (base 0.90, bonus 1.39)incentive transfers (25,663 at May 2026)TSS investment and acquisition background
Mariusz Jurak, vice-chair, board since before 202131,4863.0m1.28mincentive transferslong-standing Sygnity executive
Adam Larysz, board from 202520,5521.9m1.79mincentive transfersboard member responsible for a business sector
Daniel Fryga, vice-chair from 202512,5991.2m1.95mincentive transfersnot reviewed
Dorota Beksińska, board from 202510,4851.0m1.20mincentive transfersboard member responsible for a business sector
Monika Zientarska, CFO since Sep 20236,9590.7m0.94mincentive transfersfinance
Supervisory board: three TSS-linked members (unpaid), two independents (paid 0.14m each)————Eggink (audit chair) has decades of WSE board service

Sources: sgn-h126 p.27; sgn-rem25 pp.6-11; sgn-fy24-report (management and supervisory-board biographies). No open-market purchases or sales by board members were found in 2025–2026. Holdings rose only through incentive transfers, including 56,266 shares in May 2026.

Whose interests dominate. Executives' wealth is mostly pay. If the stock compounded at 10% a year for five years, the CEO's 40,538 shares would gain about PLN2.3m, about one year of his 2025 pay. TSS's interest is almost entirely share value: a 10% move in the price changes its stake by about PLN156m. The management board as a whole cost PLN9.49m in 2025 (boardPay2025). That is 12% of 2025 net profit and 2.7% of revenue, a heavy charge for a company with 860 employees.

Compensation metrics (sgn-rem25 p.14): consolidated net profit, EBIT, ROIC and revenue growth, plus four non-financial criteria (staff retention, succession, diversity, energy use). Variable pay is capped at 500% of fixed pay. 75% of each bonus is paid in shares, with lock-ups of up to five years. Targets are not published, so the implied hurdle can't be backed out. Including ROIC is better than earnings alone, though revenue growth and EBIT still reward size. The 2024–2028 programme can award up to 442,257 shares (1.9%), bought back or issued (incentivePlanCap). So far it has been funded by buybacks: 90,806 shares were bought for PLN6.4m in February–April 2026 at about PLN70.

Track record and references

  • Shareholder return under TSS: from the PLN12 tender price (March 2022) to PLN94 (3 November 2026) is 7.8x, about 56% a year over 4.6 years.
  • Earnings: EBIT rose from 25.4 (FY to September 2022, 12.0% margin) to 106.0 trailing June 2026 (26.2%). Derived owner cash rose from 23.9 (2021) to 104.4 (2025).
  • Valuation: the year-end price less cash, divided by net profit, went from 13x (2022) to about 24x (2023–2025), then fell to about 19x now (peExCash2022–peExCash2025).
  • Return on capital: including goodwill and acquired intangibles, about 34% after tax in 2025 (01-business.md). Working capital released cash throughout.

Decisions that failed or are unproven:

  • Idle cash. Cash went from 52 (December 2021) to 225 (June 2026) with no dividend, and only about 35 a year is being deployed.
  • Related-party deal. The g.on purchase from TSS has no disclosed stand-alone economics.
  • Deal outcomes. No deal's results are reported after its first year.

Bench depth beyond the leader: the board grew from three to six in January 2025 (Beksińska, Fryga, Larysz; sgn-fy24-report). The TSS-linked supervisory members bring CSU-family M&A practice; Ioana Corutiu, TSS CFO, has led more than 25 due diligences and 11 integrations (sgn-fy24-report, supervisory-board biographies).

References: none collected. No former employees, customers or counterparties were interviewed, so zero of zero references. The only outside view on record is mBank's 2023–2024 sell rating (target PLN35.80, then 39), and the stock has since more than doubled.

Capital allocation principles

Governing objective: Sygnity has stated none. The controlling shareholder's family manages for return on invested capital, and Sygnity's bonus includes ROIC. Since 2022 the behaviour is consistent with long-term value per share for TSS. For minorities, the open question is whether cash builds up or is returned.

  1. Zero-based allocation. Partly met. Unprofitable projects were wound down (538 projects in FY2021, 397 over the 15-month FY2023). Capitalized development stopped: 5.2 in 2022, zero in 2025. Staff moved to the sectors that renew. There is no evidence of capital moving away from an incumbent franchise, because none is in decline.
  2. Fund strategies, not projects. Met in form. The stated strategy is to "invest surplus cash in building a group of independent IT solution providers" (sgn-fy24-report p.39), and five small deals have followed it at a steady pace.
  3. Capital has a cost. Met. There have been no share issues since 2019, and debt and restructuring liabilities of 69.6 were repaid in 2021–2025. Share awards are charged and bought back rather than diluting. The cost of idle cash is not acknowledged: about 194 of cash net of the g.on payment earns deposit rates.
  4. Zero tolerance for bad growth. Met. Revenue fell 6% in 2021 while low-margin work was pruned, and the project count fell 26% to FY2023.
  5. Price versus value. Unproven. Buybacks have only offset awards, and none were made for value even at 13x earnings in 2022. There has been no dividend, so cash has not been returned when deal flow was thin. Deals have been bought at 4–9x profit, which is cheap against Sygnity's own 19–24x multiple. That is the right direction for value per share, if the profit holds.

Integrity and governance

Evidence:

  • Related-party deals. One with TSS (g.on, EUR7.2m initial price, true-up undisclosed), announced under MAR with prior flags since 2022.
  • Board. Two of five supervisory members are independent, and an independent chairs the audit committee. TSS-linked members take no fee.
  • Votes. The AGM approved the 2024 remuneration report.
  • Pay rules. No deviations from the remuneration policy in 2025, and no clawbacks (sgn-rem25 pp.3 and 24).
  • Retained profit. The June 2025 AGM put the 2024 profit (60.1) into "capital for the payment of dividends and investment purposes" (sgn-fy25 p.7). That keeps a dividend possible without committing to one.
  • Charges from the controller. The group buys services from TSS Europe: 8.4 in 2024, 11.1 in 2025 and 8.4 in H1 2026 alone, against 5.4 in H1 2025 (tssServicesPurchased2024 … tssServicesPurchasedH12026). The nature of the charge is not disclosed. In H1 2026 it equalled 18% of net profit, and it is growing faster than profit. It is already expensed, so owner cash is measured after it, but it is a channel for value to reach TSS ahead of minorities. A prospective check tracks it.
  • Controller's stake in the main competitor. Topicus holds about 24.8% of Asseco Poland (closed 1 October 2025, topicus-asseco).

The three agency costs:

  • Control of resources: moderate. Bonuses on revenue growth and EBIT reward size, and the board sources deals. ROIC in the bonus and TSS's hurdle culture are the offsets, and the deal pace has stayed small (about 35 a year).
  • Risk tolerance: low concern. TSS is diversified, and management holds little stock.
  • Time horizon: mixed. Bonuses are annual, but paid mostly in locked-up shares.

Voting and economic ownership coincide: one share, one vote. TSS controls both.

The main agency cost for an outside holder is the controller's discretion over idle cash, related-party transfers and any future buyout price. How the valuation treats it:

  • Unplaced cash earns nothing and is not distributed.
  • Probabilities carry a 30% five-year downside weight.
  • No discount is applied for a possible take-under, because there is no evidence of one. The 2022 call document's delisting reservation is recorded as a risk in 06-risks.md.

Sources: sgn-rem25, sgn-h126, sgn-fy24-report, sgn-fy25, sgn-tss-call, sgn-gon, sgn-mbank-2024.

Capital allocation

PLN millions, calendar years. 2024 and 2025 are statutory years. 2023 is the audited calendar comparative (sgn-fy24 note 44). 2021 and 2022 are derived from the audited fiscal years and the Q1 interims; each year reconciles to the cash balance within PLN0.001m (facts cfoCY2021 … cashEndCY2023). Rates and returns are named audit steps in valuation/calculations.json.

Sources and uses of cash

20212022202320242025Total
Operating cash flow36.455.154.884.1114.7345.2
of which working capital released / (invested)(7.5)18.10.2(0.1)14.124.8
of which incentive add-back (non-cash)1.00.71.30.94.17.9
of which tax paid+1.0 refund(3.0)(0.6)(1.8)(8.6)(13.0)
Capex and capitalized development(2.8)(8.2)(3.8)(3.1)(1.8)(19.6)
Lease principal(7.6)(7.8)(5.7)(4.9)(4.0)(30.0)
Interest paid(1.1)(0.6)(3.2)(1.4)(0.5)(6.7)
Owner cash, after award cost (memo)23.937.740.973.9104.4280.9
Acquisitions———(34.3)(35.7)(70.1)
Debt, bonds and restructuring agreement, net(15.6)(18.0)(12.0)(12.0)(12.0)(69.6)
Buybacks (award delivery)——(0.3)(0.5)(4.1)(4.9)
Dividends—————0
Other investing and financing, FX0.00.00.70.2(0.1)0.8
Net change in cash9.320.430.628.156.6145.1
Cash at year end (42.6 at December 2020)51.972.4102.9131.1187.7

The memo line is operating cash flow less the award add-back, capex and development, lease principal and interest. The non-cash add-back is charged there and the cash buybacks appear separately. 2021 operating cash includes the February 2021 e-Taxes settlement (about 14) and 7.5 of working-capital build. 2022 is flattered by 18.1 of working-capital release. Cash tax was minimal until 2025 because of loss carry-forwards.

What the table shows about priorities. Of 345 of operating cash over five years:

  • about 20% (69.6) retired the legacy bonds, bank loans and restructuring-agreement claims;
  • 20% (70.1) bought companies, from 2024 only;
  • 9% went to leases and 6% to capex and development;
  • 1.4% bought back shares to deliver awards, and nothing was paid in dividends;
  • 42% (145.1) accumulated as cash.

The allocator's revealed order was debt first (2021–2025, loans fully repaid in 2025), then deals at about 35 a year. The surplus beyond that was held, and cash then rose further to 225.1 by June 2026.

Investment rates per sales change

The window runs from calendar 2020 (revenue 218.7, revenueCY2020) to 2025 (350.3), a change of 131.6 (salesChangeWindow).

Rate per PLN of revenue change2021–2025Calculation
Incremental M&A (acquisitions, no disposals)0.5370.1 / 131.6 (maRateWindow)
Internally generated intangibles: capitalized development0.079.3 / 131.6 (developmentRateWindow); expensed development is not disclosed
Fixed capital, gross capex (before D&A)0.0810.3 / 131.6 (fixedRateGrossWindow); an upper bound
Working capital−0.19 (released)24.8 of cash released (workingCapitalReleasedRate)
Total≈0.49

Definitions and limits:

  • Fixed capital. This rate is gross. Own-asset D&A was not separated from right-of-use and acquisition amortization for 2021–2023. In 2024–2025, capex plus development (4.8) was below own-asset D&A (about 7.4: total D&A less right-of-use depreciation and acquisition amortization), so the true net rate is close to zero or negative.
  • Working capital. The cash-flow-statement change, excluding working capital that came with acquired companies.
  • Organic versus acquired revenue. Acquired companies contributed roughly 51 of 2025 revenue (an estimate: Edrana and Sagra at their 2024 run rates of 14.9 and 26.3, DocLogix 5.0, Mednow 4.3). The organic change is therefore about 80, and it required negative net capital: −24.8 of working capital against +19.6 of capex and development. A zloty of acquired revenue cost about 1.4 of deal capital. A zloty of organic revenue cost nothing.

Inflection points and who was in charge:

  • 2021–2022, under the pre-TSS board (Zborowski to December 2021, Jurak, Jędrzejewska). Debt repayment dominated, and capitalized development rose to 5.2 in 2022.
  • 2022 working-capital release of 18.1. Most of it came in Q1 FY2022 (21.3 in October–December 2021), before TSS took control in May 2022.
  • From 2023 (Różycki CEO from May 2022, Zientarska CFO from September 2023). Capitalized development fell to 2.9 in 2023 and zero by 2025. Deals started in 2024. Working capital released 14.1 in 2025 as customer prepayments rose by 11.0.

No peer rates were computed.

Reinvestment and returns

20212025
EBIT34.2 (16.6%)89.5 (25.5%)
NOPAT at 19%27.772.5 (78.3 before acquisition amortization)
Derived owner cash23.9104.4
Normalized owner cash (model)—94.6 trailing June 2026; 111.3 for the current portfolio
  • Reinvestment rate, 2021–2025. Acquisitions of 70.1 against derived owner cash of 280.9 is 24.9% (acquisitionReinvestmentRate). Including capex and development and netting the working-capital release, net growth capital was 64.9 (totalCapitalDeployedWindow), about 22% of owner cash before capex. The rest went to debt (69.6) or stayed as cash (145.1).
  • Incremental return. NOPAT rose by 44.8. Against net growth capital of 64.9 that is 69% unlagged (incrementalReturnWindow). Lagged one year, capital 2021–2024 was about 41.5 and the return about 108%. These numbers do not measure capital efficiency. Most of the gain is operating leverage and repricing, and it was not bought with capital.
  • Identity check. NOPAT grew 27% a year from 2021 to 2025, while reinvestment (22–25%) × incremental return (69%) gives about 16%. The identity fails because the margin recovery needed no investment. Split by use, it reconciles:
    • Volume at the old margin. Organic revenue of about 299 in 2025 (350 less about 51 acquired), at the 2021 EBIT margin of 16.6%, gives EBIT of about 49.7 and NOPAT of 40.2. That is +12.5 of NOPAT from volume.
    • Margin. The remaining organic gain is about 19–24 of NOPAT, from the move to a 24–26% margin on the organic base. It needed negative capital.
    • Acquisitions. About 8.5–13.6 of 2025 NOPAT on 70.1 of deal cash, a 12–19% yield in the first full year. It is not yet a rolling or lagged measurement.
    • Payouts. None. Buybacks of 4.9 only offset awards.
  • Forward implication. The margin step can't be repeated at the same scale. Forward compounding comes from organic volume, which has been capital-light, plus deals at 12–19% entry yields on a measured base of two deals. The model's family-aggregate 6.61x (15.1%) sits inside that range. The model also assumes cash that can't be placed earns nothing, which is consistent with the record.

Acquisition record

ClosingDeal (seller)All-in priceCash acquiredRevenue disclosedNet profit disclosedMultiplePurchase-price intangiblesLater evidence
Feb 2024Edrana Baltic, Lithuanian and Latvian ERP (private seller)10.99 (EUR2.54m; 7.46 paid at closing)1.5813.6 for 11 months2.15 for 11 months4.0x annualized net profit on net price11.3none disclosed after 2024
Mar 2024Sagra Technology, Szczecin, retail sales and analytics SaaS (founders)40.82 (31.66 at closing; cap 42.3)3.2021.9 for 10 months3.60 for 10 months8.7x40.7none disclosed
Jul 2025DocLogix, Vilnius, document management (private)7.42 (EUR1.75m)0.515.0 for 6 months0.39 for 6 months4.35x–9.04x cash proxy (existing DocLogix steps)8.1—
Dec 2025Mednow, formerly Comarch HIS, hospital information systems (Comarch)24.40 at year end (22.61 after the June 2026 update)3.034.3 for December1.04 for Decembernot measurable from one month; model proxy at 6.61x26.2—
Oct 2026g.on experience, Münster, geolocation infrastructure software (TSS, related party)EUR7.2m initial, about 31.5not disclosednot disclosednot disclosedmodel proxy at 6.61x—true-up pending

Aggregate. About 101.6 of cash over 33 months (February 2024 to October 2026) is about 37 a year, roughly a third of current owner cash. For the two deals with a full year's disclosure, the price was 4.0x–7.1x a cash proxy (deals2024LowerMultiple, deals2024UpperMultiple) and 1.15x annualized revenue. The lower bound credits back purchase-price amortization. The issuer does not report acquired companies' later results, and its organic-growth figure (about 14% in 2025) excludes only 2025 purchases. Edrana's and Sagra's 2025 growth is therefore inside "organic", and the measured deal yield can't be rolled forward. Post-integration margins are not disclosed. The measured multi-year deal yield remains a bound on two first-year results, so the model prices future deals at the CSU-family aggregate (6.61x) and uses Sygnity's own range as a cross-check.

Deployment record (measured 4 November 2026)

Calendar year202120222023202420252026 to date
Deal cash00034.335.735.1 (g.on 31.5 + deferred 3.6)
  • Average: 14.0 over 2021–2025 including the dry years (recordMean2021to2025); 26.3 over the TSS era 2023–2026 (tssEraMean); 35.1 over the active era 2024–2026 (activeEraMean).
  • Spread: the best year (35.7) is 2.55 times the five-year mean, and the worst is zero. Within the active era the spread is only ±2% (34.3–35.7).
  • Quiet runs: the longest is three years (2021–2023).
  • Reference class: 2021–2022 fall in the creditor restructuring before TSS control, a different regime. 2023 was TSS's setup year; the first deal was signed in December 2023. The base uses the expected budget: active-era pace × the TSS-era active-year frequency of 0.75 = 26.3, grown 3.4% a year (debate verdict). It places no quiet year in a specific year, because no deal timing is evidenced. The downside repeats the three-year dry spell, then deploys the five-year mean.

Current owner-cash bridge and deployable cash

The starting point for valuation is consolidated cash after funding the existing business, not an adjusted EBITDA multiple. Development staff and delivery spending remain operating expenses. Sustaining purchases and lease cash are charged. Amortization of acquired customer relationships is not charged a second time as a cash replacement expense.

Trailing September 2026 bridge (FY2025 + 9M 2026 − 9M 2025, reported 10 Nov)PLN m
Reported operating cash flow160.767
Remove working-capital cash contribution-48.437
Replace paid tax with current tax expense+2.657
Retain employee-share economic cost-7.695
Sustaining tangible/intangible cash investment-1.450
Cash lease principal-4.677
Financing paid outside operating cash-0.073
Remove after-tax cash/financial interest-3.671
Normalized trailing owner cash (current-tax definition)97.421
Add back current tax on the excluded working-capital timing+9.270
September earning power106.691

The tax adjustment replaces PLN36.354m paid with PLN33.697m of current expense. Current tax itself is inflated by tax on customer advances: the deferred-tax asset on deferred income rose 5.1 and the contract-revenue deferred-tax liability fell 4.2 over the year. The bridge already excludes the 48.4 working-capital inflow those advances created, so it excludes the tax on them too (19% of 48.4 is 9.2). The missing Mednow months (0.534) and the g.on proxy (4.767) give current-portfolio owner cash of 112.0. These are inferred additions, not reported target results; see 07-assumption-register.md. The measured KPO wave (10.2) is removed and the remaining measured base (96.5) is rolled 0.57 years at the 2025 organic growth of about 14% (+7.7), giving the 109.5 anchor run rate. Retained cash earns the measured 1.56% after-tax deposit yield, and deals earn half a year in their purchase year.

September cash of 281.080 is reduced by the g.on initial payment (31.496; closed 2 October, after the balance sheet) and an operating reserve of 73.915 (three months of nine-month cash costs), leaving 175.669 before year-one claims: 9.219 of acquisition and tax payables and 24.447 for the after-tax reversal of the 2026 customer-advance build (contract liabilities 25.6 in September 2025, 85.8 in September 2026). Reserve cash, the joint venture and financial receivables remain assets at face value. Deal cash is a stated yearly budget (08-underwriting-plan.md). Base: 26.3 in year 1, growing 3.4% a year to 35.5 in year 10 (expected budget including quiet-year frequency: active-era pace 35.1 × 0.75). Downside: 0 for three years, then 14.0. Upside: 35.7, 44.2, 44.2, 58.4, 58.4, then 95.0. Idle cash earns the measured after-tax deposit yield (1.56%). The PLN80m facility is not added to cash.

Sources: sgn-fy21, sgn-fy22, sgn-fy23, sgn-fy24, sgn-fy25, sgn-h126, sgn-q121, sgn-q122, sgn-presentation, sgn-gon, sgn-facility, sgn-fx. research/10-capital-efficiency.md holds the engine's forward capital-productivity diagnostics.

Thesis & valuation

Sygnity can compound if two things hold: the repriced incumbent franchise keeps its margin as wages rise, and management buys more software cash at attractive all-in prices instead of letting cash pile up. The causal links are renewals and regulatory change work, cash conversion after staff costs, the actual deal pipeline, and value retained for all common shareholders. TSS affiliation is context, not a substitute for those tests. No supplied Sygnity thesis or target return exists; the company is underwritten independently from filings. The driver plan in 08-underwriting-plan.md was written before returns were calculated.

At PLN97.00 on 10 November 2026 (exits fixed at 27 Oct 2031 / 2036)5-year XIRR10-year XIRR
Downside: revenue −2% then flat, owner-cash margin 24.8% → 23.3% from year 2, three dry deal years then 14.0 a year, 11.45x−2.7%1.7%
Base: organic revenue 9.5% / 7% / 5.5%, margin held at 24.8%, expected deal budget 26.3 (+3.4% a year; active-era pace × 0.75 active-year frequency) priced at 1.06x revenue with a 16.2% margin, 15.97x10.3%10.2%
Upside: organic revenue 13% / 11% / 9%, margin 25.3% from year 3, deal budget growing 15%, 15.97x14.7%14.4%
Probability-weighted cash flows (30/50/20; 35/40/25)8.08%9.27%

The 10 November roll to the full Q3 report (07-assumption-register.md, 10 November section) replaced the provisional September bridge with reported cash, tax, balances and claims, and measured the KPO wave at 10.2 of owner cash (was a judged 6.06). Run-rate owner cash fell from 113.3 to 109.5; Q3's retained cash raised opening funds, less a 24.4 year-one claim for the reversal of the 2026 customer-advance build. Margins are now the measured starting margin (24.8%, higher because the lower-margin KPO revenue left with its cash) with the same stated downside compression and upside gain. At PLN97 on 10 November, the five-year weighted figure moved from 8.74% to 8.08% (−0.66 points; ten years 9.62% to 9.27%).

The changes were the anchor run-rate starting point (119.8 instead of 111.3), deals earning half a year in the purchase year, a measured 1.56% after-tax return on retained cash, 3.4% growth of acquired businesses, and a 12.2x downside exit. Before the calibration the figures were 1.5/12.4/15.1% and 10.2% weighted over five years. The growth-durability review on the same day removed the KPO hospital wave from starting earnings (119.8 to 115.7) and raised organic growth to 6.51%/11.0%. The five-year figures moved from 1.3/14.1/16.9% (11.5% weighted) to 0.6/14.7/18.8% (12.2% weighted). The bull–bear debate on the same day (12-debate.md) then raised the KPO wave to 6.06 (baseline 113.3), set base deal-capacity growth to 3.4% (a flat deal count), and replaced the 18x and 12.2x exits with a Koller value at a 10.45% market cost of equity (16.0x and 11.5x). Those changes give the table above. Revenue build (3 Nov): the model now projects revenue and margin on yearly paths (08-underwriting-plan.md, Yearly paths). Before it, the debate-judged figures were −0.6/11.9/16.1% and 9.7% weighted (five years). Lumpy deal budget (4 Nov): yearly deal cash from the measured record replaced the smooth cap, moving the five-year weighted figure from 9.65% to 9.39%. The base uses the expected budget including quiet-year frequency. There is no common dividend. Returns come from terminal per-share equity, including retained cash and separately held assets, after claims. The multiple prices normalized after-financing owner cash. The weighted figure is the IRR of probability-weighted dated cash flows, not an average of IRRs.

Pre-mortem

  • One-foot or three-foot hurdle? One-and-a-half feet. The cash mechanics are simple: high margin, negative working capital, no debt. The durability of renewals with ministries and NBP can't be verified from outside, and contract margins are not disclosed.
  • Cyclical or secular? Mostly secular: maintenance and regulatory work on installed systems. There is a regulation-timed layer in utilities (Solidarity Shield, CSIRE), and public budgets are tied to EU-fund cycles that we did not measure.
  • How could it be a value trap? Cash accumulates (225 in June 2026, rising about 70 a year beyond deal spending) while the controller neither deploys nor distributes it. Minorities would then own a growing pile of cash earning about 1.6% after tax. The base case leaves 697 of cash on the balance sheet in year five.
  • Cigar butt or productive asset? A productive asset. Return on capital including goodwill is about 34% after tax, and growth has released working capital.
  • Agency cost? Yes. It is the controller's discretion over idle cash, related-party deals (g.on) and any future buyout price, plus management-board pay of 9.5 (12% of 2025 net profit).
  • Good or bad execution? Assume CSU-family discipline on deal prices (the record so far is 4–9x profit). Do not assume a repeat of the 2022–2025 margin step, which is a one-time repricing.
  • Turnaround? It was one, and it has succeeded: EBIT margin from 12% in FY2022 to 26%. Underwriting from here is not a turnaround bet, but it inherits the risk that a turnaround margin regresses.
  • Big promises, little record? The deal strategy has only two and a half years of record and five small deals, with no post-acquisition results reported.
  • Unique IP a larger competitor could squash? The intellectual property is system-specific domain code. Asseco could underbid at a retender, but the customer's switching risk protects the incumbent.
  • Single product or fad? No. Revenue is spread across public (33%), banking (29%), utilities (22%) and acquired niches. NBP is the largest identifiable relationship at up to about 7–8% of revenue.

Exit multiple

EvidenceMultipleDenominator
Sygnity year-end market value less cash / net profit: 2022, 2023, 2024, 202513.3x, 21.6x, 24.0x, 23.8xpeExCash2022–peExCash2025
Today: PLN2,139m less 193.6 of cash after the g.on payment / provisional trailing September net profit 104.618.6xequity ex-cash
Today: the same / normalized portfolio owner cash 111.317.5xmodel denominator
Peak (30 July 2025, PLN118)about 40x trailing profit
Asseco Poland, trailing P/E (aggregator, 28 Oct 2026; 17.7x in July 2026)24.2xequity, not reconciled
Pre-TSS (2019–2021, PLN2–10 during the creditor restructuring)not comparabledistressed

Koller check: value = earnings × (1 − g/RONIC)/(r − g). Base terminal growth of 5% is made of about 3% organic growth (near-zero capital) and about 2% from deals at a 15% yield, which needs reinvesting about 13% of earnings. That gives (1 − 0.13)/(r − 0.05).

Debate judgment (3 November 2026). The cost of equity is now estimated, not assumed:

  • Build-up. The 6.31% PLN 10-year yield on 3 Nov 2026 (te-pl10y), less Poland's 0.72% default spread, plus Damodaran's 5.33% total ERP (damodaran-ctryprem, January 2026), gives 10.92%. Subtracting the spread means country risk is counted once (damodaran-riskfree).
  • Market-implied. The 17.5x paid on 3 Nov implies 9.98%.
  • Judged rate. The two are weighted equally: r = 10.45% (judgedCostOfEquity).

The base and upside exit is 0.87/(0.1045 − 0.05) = 16.0x (baseExitMultiple). The 18x it replaced needed r of about 9.8%, below both estimates. The zero-growth value at that r is 9.6x, so the downside is now 11.5x, the midpoint with the 13.3x end-2022 trough (downsideExitMultiple). It was 12.2x at the 9% owner hurdle, and 14x before 3 November. Higher growth in the upside still earns no higher multiple. The Asseco figure in the table is unusable: aggregators show 9–24x depending on the denominator. The bear case below tests 12x.

Bear case

The price we could sell at after five years if we were not forced sellers, given a specific onerous mechanism:

  • Margin. Wage inflation and tender pricing pull EBIT margin back from about 26% to 21%, roughly the 2024 level. That cuts owner cash by about 20%, to about 96 from the 119.8 run rate.
  • Growth. None after that.
  • Deals. TSS sends CEE deals elsewhere, or none clear the hurdle, so cash builds at zero return.
  • Exit. 12x, between 2022's 13.3x and the zero-growth value.

Result at PLN94: 5-year XIRR −3.0%, 10-year +1.1% (−4.5% and 0.0% before the calibration). Net cash, now earning interest, and retained earnings limit the loss: the business still earns about 96 a year, kept as cash.

Tails this omits:

  • an e-Taxes-type fixed-price failure with penalties and guarantee calls (13.1 of guarantees outstanding);
  • loss of the NBP contract at its end-2027 expiry or of the Ministry of Family systems;
  • related-party value transfer through repeated purchases from TSS;
  • a controller buyout at a price below value, or a delisting that impairs liquidity;
  • Polish wage inflation well above price increases for several years.

Variant view

This is the judged view after the bull–bear debate (12-debate.md), not either advocate's.

History. The market's mispricing ran in our favor from 2022 to 2024. It treated Sygnity as a tender-driven integrator: mBank had a sell rating, forecast 17.6% EBIT for 2025, and the stock ended 2022 at 13x earnings. The unit economics in stage 3 (EBIT per employee from 37k to 104k) and the measured returns in stage 6 showed the repricing the market missed. That gap has closed.

Where the debate left the business. It survived:

  • the parent company's organic growth of 13–17% and maintenance growth of 17–23% are measured and durable in the near term;
  • there is net cash, and no plausible permanent loss appears in the representative paths.

What did not survive was the valuation at PLN94:

  • Cost of equity. A cost of equity built from the 6.31% PLN 10-year yield is about 10.9%. Even averaged with the rate the market implies today, it is 10.45%. That supports about 16x for a 5% grower, not the 18x the base used.
  • KPO wave. Q3 profit points to a larger deadline wave (6.06 of owner cash, not 3.85).
  • Deal pace. Three flat years support a flat deal count, not 10% capacity growth.

Returns. On the judged model the base returned 11.9% and the probability-weighted figure 9.7% over five years at PLN94 on 3 November (10.5% over ten). After the 10 November Q3 roll the base is 10.3% and the weighted figure 8.1% at PLN97. That is below a 12% hurdle. The price implies about 3.3% organic cash growth at an 18x exit for a 9% return (no-deal diagnostic, 08-underwriting-plan.md). At 16x the implied growth is higher.

Verdict: fairly priced to slightly expensive for a controlled, low-float company. There is no mispricing in our favor at PLN97 (10 November 2026). The five-year weighted return reaches 12% near PLN81 (was near PLN85 before the Q3 roll).

The deal option on idle cash adds about 2.2 points of base return over no deals (11.9% against 9.6%). It rests on CSU-family purchases at about 15% entry yields. There is no hard catalyst. Possible ones:

  • a faster deal pace;
  • confirmation in the 10 November report that the KPO wave was small.

Why the opportunity exists

  • Size: PLN2,139m market value (22.76m shares at PLN94).
  • Float: holders below 5% own 4.17m shares (18.3%), about PLN392m (freeFloatShares). TSS (72.68%) and Barca (9.01%) do not trade.
  • Liquidity: median daily trading over the last three months was PLN0.78m, mean 1.57m (medianDailyValue3m). Turning over the free float takes about 500 trading days at the median, or 250 at the mean.
  • Coverage: mBank covered the stock with a sell rating in 2023–2024. A search found no 2026 broker target. Short interest, index membership and retail ownership were not checked.
  • What drove sellers: the stock fell from 118 (July 2025) to the low 70s in early 2026 while earnings rose, as the multiple compressed from about 40x towards 20x. It has since recovered to 94.

Neglect is real: low float, a controller, and coverage that was wrong and has lapsed. Part of the discount is justified, though. Minorities can't direct cash, deal terms or a future buyout. That is why the base exit is not set at Asseco's 24x or the stock's own 2023–2025 levels.

What would prove us wrong

ObservationWhere and whenWhat it would refute
EBIT margin below 22% in H2 2026 or H1 2027FY2026 annual report (about April 2027); H1 2027 report (September 2027)that the repricing is durable, which supports base cash growth
September cash conversion: operating cash after working capital well below the provisional profit bridge (model 106.0; label-implied 100)Q3 report, 10 November 2026the measured base under the 119.8 run rate. Scored 10 Nov: 97.4 on the frozen definition, entirely from current tax on customer advances; 106.7 timing-consistent
Organic revenue growth below 8% in Q3 2026 (parent nine-month growth below 10%)Q3 report, 10 November 2026the 14% run-rate roll (+8.2) and the 6.51% base. Scored 10 Nov: parent nine months +14.0%, Q3 alone +9.1%; consolidated organic split not disclosed
Nine-month over-time revenue above 110, or Q4 2026 over-time revenue above 40Q3 report (10 Nov) and FY2026 report (about March 2027)the KPO-wave reading; the wave would then return to the base. Nine months 101.7 (above the 80–95 band, not refuted); Q4 open
Purchases from TSS Europe above about 17 in 2026, or a new related-party dealFY2026 related-party noteminority fairness
Acquisition cash below 20 in calendar 2027, or deals above 10x cashFY2027 reportthe deal pace and price behind about 2.7 points of base return
A second related-party purchase from TSS without disclosed target economicscurrent reportsminority fairness, pointing to a lower terminal multiple
NBP not renewing the ZSK contract beyond December 2027, or a lost Ministry of Family systemcurrent reports in 2027franchise durability
A special dividend or a regular payoutAGM resolutions, June 2027the zero-return cash drag; a favorable surprise
Q3 subsidiaries' pretax increase below about 3.5 (KPO wave near the 3.85 tail), or above about 7 (near the bear's 7.4)Q3 report segment and separate statements, 10 November 2026the judged 6.06 KPO wave (debate verdict 3). Scored 10 Nov: 9.65 (range 9.2–10.1); the wave is now the measured residual, 10.2 owner cash
Polish 10-year yield below 5.3% or above 7.3% for a quartermarket datathe 10.45% judged cost of equity behind the 16x exit (debate verdict 2)
Calendar 2027 deal cash above 45 (capacity growth well above 3.4%)FY2027 reportthe flat-deal-count base (debate verdict 5)
A voluntary TSS tender or a delisting resolutioncurrent reportsthe minority-exit tail (debate verdict 7)

The Q3, margin, deal-pace, calendar-2026 and 2027 owner-cash, NBP and debate checks are recorded in valuation/prospective-checks.json. Permanent-loss paths and unverified inputs are updated in 06-risks.md.

Sources: financial facts, named calculations and the method and assumption registers; sgn-fy25, sgn-h126, sgn-9m26-preliminary, sgn-mbank-2024, sgn-price-history, asseco-pe-aggregator, sgn-rem25, sgn-tss-call. No Harvia margin, ROIIC or growth schedule was imported.

Risks & disconfirming evidence

Return effects are single-variable diagnostics on the recorded base (5-year base XIRR 12.3% on the revenue build), not probabilities. Figures marked "judged model" predate the revenue build.

Permanent-loss paths

  1. Margin regression of the repriced franchise. The EBIT margin doubled from 12% (FY2022) to about 26%, driven by pruning, less subcontracting and price, while pay per FTE rose 37% (2021→2025). If renewals reprice down at retender, or wages outrun prices, margins can return towards 2024's 22–23% or lower. The bear case (margin to about 21%, no deals, 12x) gives −3.6% over 5 years.
  2. Contract failure on a fixed-price build. e-Taxes shows the mechanism: a tender won on price, subcontractor disputes, years of litigation and a settlement of about PLN14m in 2021. Issued guarantees were 13.1 at June 2026. A full call in year one lowers the base by about 0.1 points, but it does not capture the reputational and operational damage of a failure.
  3. Loss of a core relationship. The NBP ZSK contract (up to about 27 a year net) runs to 31 December 2027. The Ministry of Family systems run on 48-month contracts from 2024. A retender loss, or insourcing to state IT centres, would remove high-margin recurring work. 4a. KPO deadline cliff and growth quality. The revenue build removes the wave as 18.5 of revenue at a 32.8% owner-cash margin. If the true wave revenue was larger, the removal is larger and the implied wave margin lower. About two-thirds of H1 2026 revenue growth came from acquired subsidiaries, all of it over-time project revenue that includes KPO hospital contracts ending 31 August 2026. The model removes the estimated wave (3.8 of owner cash). If the wave was twice as large, the 5-year base falls to 14.0%. If base growth stays at 5% rather than 6.51%, it falls to 13.5%. 4b. Control mechanics (Polish Public Offering Act, in force 3 Nov 2026).
    • Squeeze-out: possible only at 95% (art.82), which needs about 5.1m more shares, including Barca's 2.05m. Minorities can likewise demand a buyout (sell-out) only once a holder passes 95% (art.83).
    • Delisting: needs a resolution passed by 9/10 of votes cast, with half the capital present, after a tender for all remaining shares (art.91). Barca alone can block it by attending and voting against.
    • Tender price floor: the higher of the 3- and 6-month VWAP and the highest price paid in 12 months, or fair value set by an audit firm if trading is thin (art.79). No premium is required.
    • What this means: minority upside from a take-out is a negotiated premium, not a legal right. The downside is a tender timed after a drawdown at the floor, about PLN80–84 today. That is the mean daily close over 3 months (83.6) and 6 months (79.9), an approximation of art.79's average of daily VWAPs (sgn-price-history), against PLN94 now. The 2022 call reserved a future delisting. 4c. Related-party charges. Payments to TSS Europe were 11.1 in 2025 and 8.4 in H1 2026, and they are growing faster than profit.
  4. Controller and minority risk. TSS holds 72.68%. The 2022 call reserved a future delisting "if an opportunity arises". A buyout below intrinsic value, repeated related-party purchases (g.on, EUR7.2m, no stand-alone financials) or a cash pile left idle would transfer value or depress the exit price. The float is about PLN392m, with median daily trading of PLN0.78m. Debate verdict 7 (unresolved): TSS is past the mandatory-tender threshold, so a tender would be voluntary and a squeeze-out needs Barca. A floor-price tender with a delisting threat after a drawdown (about PLN80–84 today, −6.6% a year if taken in year two) remains a coercive tail inside the downside weight.
  5. Deal economics. The deal yield rests on two first-year results (Edrana, Sagra: 4.0x–8.7x net profit) and a family reference class (6.61x). On the expected yearly deal budget (4 Nov), the 5-year base is 11.7%, against 12.3% with a smooth 35.7 budget. On the revenue build, removing all future deals lowers the 5-year base from 12.3% to 10.1%, and a margin 2 points lower in every year (21%) gives 10.5%. Earlier figure: from 11.9% to 9.6% (judged model, 3 Nov 2026 debate).
  6. Valuation. Since the debate the base and upside exit is 16.0x, a Koller value at a 10.45% judged cost of equity (05-thesis.md, 12-debate.md). At 14x the 5-year base is 9.6%, at 18x 14.0% and at 22x 17.9%. The Polish 10-year yield (6.31% on 3 Nov 2026) is the main external input: each point moves the multiple by about 3x.
  7. Regulation-timed demand. Utilities revenue grew 34% from FY2022 to 2024 during the Solidarity Shield and CSIRE adaptations. Up to about 16 of revenue and 6–7 of EBIT may fade as those programmes end.

Unverified inputs

  • September 2026 cash conversion. Resolved 10 November: reported pretax cash matched the profit bridge; only current tax on customer advances differed (97.4 strict, 106.7 timing-consistent). The open risk is now the advance build itself: 85.8 of contract liabilities at September (25.6 a year earlier). If the KPO-era advances unwind, cash falls without new revenue cash; the model charges 24.4 after tax in year one.
  • Run-rate roll. The +8.5 uplift to the anchor run rate assumes the 2025 organic growth of about 14% continued; without it the 5-year base is 10.5% on the judged model. The debate upheld the 14% (a past window filled with observed growth). The Q3 report should show the 2026 organic rate.
  • Mednow and g.on earning power. Mednow is inferred from one month of consolidation and its net price. g.on is a proxy at 6.61x its price, with no revenue disclosed. Removing both estimated additions lowers the 5-year base by about 0.9 points.
  • Idle cash is partly customer money. Contract liabilities rose 14.4 in H1 2026 to 55.8, probably including KPO advances that unwind as projects finish. Public receivables settle late in the year (Q4 2025 released about 17 of working capital). After the g.on payment, about 194 of cash at June less the 71 reserve leaves about 120 that is genuinely surplus.
  • Cash return. Retained cash earns the measured H1 2026 deposit yield, 1.56% after tax. A change in Polish rates moves it.
  • Operating reserve. 71.1 (one quarter of cash costs) is a judgment. Negative working capital means part of the cash is customer prepayments (contract liabilities of 55.8 at June 2026).
  • Tax. Current tax is charged. The IP-box effective rate (about 15%) is not assumed to persist beyond what current tax shows.
  • Employee awards. The economic cost is charged once and replacement buybacks are assumed to prevent dilution. The plan cap is 442,257 shares (1.9%).
  • Sector margins and contract profitability. Not disclosed. The unit economics are built from group averages.
  • Customer and competitor evidence. No fieldwork. Some customer pages (PGE) timed out, and no customer-budget figure was inserted into the model.

Next review

The 10 November Q3 report was read and rolled into the model. Next: the g.on price settlement and any IRGA-related change in TSS's 72.68% holding (current reports); Asseco's Q3 report (26 November) as peer context; the FY2026 annual report (date unpublished; FY2025 came on 24 March) for the Q4 over-time cliff, the unwinding of the 85.8 advance balance, the H2 margin, TSS purchases (9M 11.1) and the 2027 deal pace (prospective checks). The parent's Q3 slowdown to +9.1% is the leading growth question.

Sources: sgn-q326, sgn-h126, sgn-9m26-preliminary, sgn-gon, sgn-facility, sgn-calendar, sgn-tss-call, sgn-fy21-report, sgn-fy24-report, sgn-nbp-contract, sgn-rem25, sgn-asseco-h126.

Thesis-to-model register

No supplied author forecast/return exists. Exact source calibration is the cash-statement reconciliation and matching accounting perimeter, not an invented historical IRR target. Current scenarios are new dated underwriting. The pre-return plan and self-evaluation remain separate.

DriverObserved anchorEconomic mechanism and chosen estimateWhat changes itModel field
Earning powerFY2025 and H1 2026 consolidated CFO; sgn-fy25 printed p.8, sgn-h126 p.13; Q3 profit bridge sgn-q325 p.7, sgn-9m26-preliminary p.1Remove timing-related working capital, replace paid tax with current expense, charge share awards, capex/leases/financing, remove non-operating interest. PLN94.580m June trailing cash. The 2 November provisional September bridge gives PLN106.026m, and estimated target additions take the portfolio to PLN111.258m (27 October: PLN100.603m).Actual cash conversion, tax, target results or recurring spending.baseline.equityCashEarnings; underwritingBridge
Organic growthFY2025 revenue bridge and servicing/implementation tables; sgn-presentation slides 6-8, sgn-h126 p.18Installation/servicing demand and regulatory work support cash growth after ongoing costs. Base 6.51% (own 2020–2025 through-cycle rate), downside 0%, upside 11.0%; judgments below recent parent growth, not issuer guidance. Kept by the 3 Nov 2026 debate against the bull's 7.5% and the bear's 5.0%.Customer retention, tender wins/losses, pricing, wages, maintenance mix and AI competition.growthRate
Employee economicsH1 p.13 CFO addback and pp.27-33 awards/buybacksCharge economic award cost, keep all issued shares, assume replacements prevent additional dilution. No duplicate buyback expense or free retirement benefit.Net issuance, award market value, buyback prices and scheme changes.normalizedTrailingOwnerCash; shares; dilutionRate
Operating cashJune cash and cost/contract notes; H1 pp.10, 19Hold three months of observed cash operating costs, PLN71.075m, outside deployment. The reserve remains a separately valued asset.Delivery obligations, advances, payroll needs or restricted cash.openingCash; retainedAssets
Post-period purchaseOctober g.on release and NBP transaction-date FXEstimate initial outflow at PLN31.496m. No acquired cash invented. Estimate target cash separately using the disclosed purchase-cash proxy.Final consideration, actual settlement FX, target cash and operating results.gonCashPrice; gonOwnerCash
Missing Mednow cashH1 p.23 updated PPA; annual pp.41-42; consolidation from 1 December 2025Use updated net capital and the acquisition proxy. The 2 November provisional bridge covers October 2025–September 2026, so only two months are missing: PLN0.527m (27 October June bridge: five months, PLN1.318m). No single December annualization.Reported stand-alone full-year cash and updated allocation.mednowMissingCash
Purchase valuationCSU-family 2020–2025 achieved aggregate (see calculations.json aggregate steps); DocLogix annual pp.41-42 as cross-check6.61× all-in owner cash (15.1% yield), a family reference class because Sygnity's own record is two to three deals. DocLogix implies 4.35×–9.04× (midpoint 6.70×).Sygnity's own post-close deal cash, CEE price competition, the implementation mix.acquisitionMultiple
DeploymentFY2025 acquisition cash PLN35.736m (annual p.8); g.on about PLN31.5m (October 2026)First-year purchases match the observed pace; annual purchases are capped at it, with capacity growth 0%/3.4%/15% by scenario (base: a flat deal count whose cash per deal grows with target earnings, since the 3 Nov 2026 debate; upside: CSU-family reference class). Unplaced cash is retained at face value; no dividend is declared.Actual pipeline and execution capacity. Cash availability alone is insufficient.reinvestmentRate; deploymentCapacity; deploymentGrowth
Debt and claimsJune balance/claims, H1 pp.10 and 28-33; facility amendmentYear-one acquisition/tax claims PLN6.507m; explicit retirement/litigation/bond claims. No extra debt draw; contingent guarantees stress-tested separately.Settlements, financing use, guarantees called or changes in claims.cashClaims; retainedClaims
Exit valueBusiness-critical installed base versus project/control riskBase/upside 16.0x normalized after-financing cash, the Koller value at a 10.45% judged market cost of equity (build-up from the PLN 10-year yield and Damodaran's ERP, averaged with the market-implied rate); downside 11.5x (1/r averaged with the 2022 trough). Cash/assets and claims counted once. Was 18x/12.2x before the 3 Nov 2026 debate.Durable quality/runway, governance or financing change.exitMultiple
DistributionsJune AGM equity statementNo declared common dividend; retain cash. Employee-share purchases do not become shareholder receipts.Declared payout or changed allocation policy.payoutRatio; distributionPolicy

Facts have stable IDs, periods, units and precise locators. Every model input has evidence and an explicit estimate classification where needed. Named calculations preserve the chain from observation to current model. Price changes affect entry cost, not this operating forecast or the terminal multiple. Dated subjective probability weights and revision triggers are recorded separately in research/11-scenario-probabilities.md. The ~15.35% resource control differs from the forecast period-weighted external reinvestment rate; see research/10-capital-efficiency.md.

2 November 2026 preliminary nine-month results

Sygnity current report 29/2026 (2 November, p.1; Polish original) gives approximate 9M 2026 consolidated revenue PLN336.3m, EBITDA PLN102.2m, pretax profit PLN92.8m and net profit PLN75.9m. It contains no cash flow, balance sheet, tax note or acquisition note. The full report is confirmed for 10 November.

Input27 October (June bridge)2 November (provisional)Basis
Trailing owner-cash base94.580106.026June bridge plus Q3 2026 − Q3 2025 pretax profit (36.686 − 22.496) at the H1 2026 current-tax rate (21.98%), plus the D&A change, less the capex/lease changes. Q3 2026 costs are estimated as half of H1
Missing Mednow months1.318 (5 months)0.527 (2 months)Window now ends September
Portfolio owner cash100.603111.258Plus unchanged g.on proxy 4.704
Base deployment fraction~16.12%~15.35%First-year spend held at PLN35.736m; the denominator grew

Unchanged: opening cash, operating reserve and claims (still June balances less the g.on payment; unreported Q3 cash is not added), exit multiples 18×/14×, growth paths and probability weights.

Mechanism and limits. Replacing a trailing quarter is not annualizing one quarter. Pretax profit already charges employee awards and accrued financing, so neither is deducted again. Unresolved: implementation-revenue timing within Q3, a small change in deposit interest inside pretax profit (H1 2026 cash interest was PLN2.25m), cash tax and working capital. Replace every estimate with the 10 November statements; if September CFO conversion differs, revise the base and record the effect.

Return effect at the same PLN95.90 price and 2 November date (exits fixed): 5-year downside/base/upside 1.06%/12.94%/17.92% versus −0.79%/11.03%/15.96%; weighted-cash-flow XIRR 11.08% versus 9.18%. 10-year weighted 11.54% versus 10.63%.

3 November 2026: family deal rules applied (closing loop)

The serial-acquirer rules adopted for CSU and Lumine (see docs/learning/investor-learning-log.md, 3 November) also apply here. Sygnity is controlled by Topicus, so the CSU-family record is a disclosed reference class, not a borrowed assumption about Polish IT services.

InputBeforeAfterBasis
Purchase multiple6.70× (DocLogix midpoint)6.61× (family aggregate)One small deal becomes a cross-check
Deal capacitynone: the fraction of resources rose with cash, PLN35.7m → about PLN93m in year fivecapped at PLN35.736m, growing 0%/10%/15%FY2025 annual p.8; g.on shows a flat pace
Unplaced cashretainedretained (stated)No declared dividend; cash historically accumulated
Portfolio owner cashPLN111.258mPLN111.333mMednow and g.on proxies at the new multiple

Return effects at PLN95.90, 2 November 2026, exits fixed: 5-year downside/base/upside 1.06%/12.94%/17.92% → 1.07%/11.91%/14.64%; weighted 11.08% → 9.72%. 10-year weighted 11.54% → 9.61%. Probabilities are unchanged. Retaining unplaced cash at zero return is conservative: a future special dividend, as Topicus paid in 2025, would raise the return. The 10 November statements remain the next evidence for both earning power and deployment.

3 November 2026: pipeline evidence tested against the inputs (no change)

Five years of filings were added (see updates/2026-11-03-pipeline-completion.md). Each finding was checked against the input it bears on:

DriverNew evidenceEffect on the estimate
Purchase valuation (acquisitionMultiple 6.61x)Edrana and Sagra 2024: 4.0x–7.1x a cash proxy, depending on amortization push-down (deals2024LowerMultiple, deals2024UpperMultiple)inside Sygnity's own range; kept
Deployment cap (35.7, +0/10/15%)34.3, 35.7, about 31.5: flat for three yearskept
Organic growth (0/5/8%)2021–2025 NOPAT growth was about half margin repricing, a quarter volume and a quarter deals (research/04-capital-allocation.md)5% does not extrapolate the repricing; kept, with margin durability as a prospective check
Exit (18x / 14x)own year-end ex-cash P/E 13–24x; today 17.5x on the model denominator; Koller 17–22x at r of 9–10% and g of 5%18x kept; 14x downside is generous against an 11x zero-growth value, so the bear case is tested at 12x separately (05-thesis.md)
Cash taxloss carry-forwards exhausted (no tax losses at June 2026; H1 2026 paid 24.3)confirms charging current tax

Return effect: none. At PLN94 on 3 November 2026, the 5-year weighted return is 10.17% and the 10-year 9.83%.

3 November 2026: author calibration against the CSU-family cash P/E table

The owner's rule: deviating from a referenced investor needs a written, evidence-based reason. The table's forward columns (references/csu-family-cash-pe-2026-11-02.json) imply 109.6 of calendar-2026 and 134.7 of calendar-2027 owner cash; the previous model gave about 119 for 2027.

InputBeforeAfterNamed stepEvidence and verdict
Starting owner cash (baseline.equityCashEarnings)111.3 (trailing sum plus proxies)119.8 (anchor run rate)runRateUplift, runRateOwnerCashThe trailing window is centred 0.57 years before the anchor; 2025 organic growth was about 14%. Our trailing restart was a convenience. Adopt-modified.
Purchase-year contribution of dealsnonehalf a yeardealPartYearDeals close through the year (Feb, Mar, Jul, Dec, Oct). Adopt.
Return on retained cash0%1.56% after taxretainedCashAfterTaxYieldH1 2026 deposit interest 1.982 on average cash of 206; interest is already excluded from operating cash. Adopt.
Acquired-business growth (base, upside)0%3.4%acquiredBusinessGrowthCSU-family 2021-2025 mean organic growth. Adopt.
Downside exit14x12.2xdownsideExitMultiple14x sat above the 11.1x zero-growth value; midpoint with the 13.3x 2022 trough. Our own evidence.
Base organic growth5%5% (kept)baseCashGrowthThe label needs 7.4% only for a 1.6% residual, inside definitional tolerance. The margin has plateaued and the 2022-2025 repricing was one-time. Unresolved; prospective checks.
Deal pace35.7, +0/10/15%kept—Three flat years of observed pace. Reject the faster-deployment route.

Return effect at PLN94, 3 November 2026, exits fixed:

HorizonDownsideBaseUpsideWeighted
5 years, before → after1.48% → 1.27%12.37% → 14.14%15.11% → 16.92%10.17% → 11.52%
10 years, before → after2.94% → 3.29%11.28% → 12.48%13.94% → 15.11%9.83% → 10.85%

Step by step for the five-year weighted rate: run rate +1.41, half-year deals +0.08, cash return +0.16, acquired growth +0.10, downside exit −0.39 points. Probabilities are unchanged (11-scenario-probabilities.md).

3 November 2026: growth-durability review (KPO cliff and organic growth)

The review checked whether the 2025–2026 growth lasts (02-history.md, growth decomposition).

InputBeforeAfterNamed stepEvidence and verdict
KPO hospital wave in starting earningsincluded (119.8)removed: −3.8 of owner cash, so the baseline is 115.7kpoWaveOwnerCash, portfolioExKpo, runRateOwnerCashMednow's KPO OPTIMED NXT contracts (22.8 gross, Q1 2026) must be completed by 15 Jul 2026, with spending eligible to 31 Aug 2026 (kpo-d112-schedule). Subsidiaries' over-time revenue rose +35.8 in H1 while their pretax rose only +3.9. Estimated as the subsidiaries' H1 profit increase, less DocLogix and a Mednow base, plus a Q3 tail of 50%; range about 3–8.
Run-rate rollapplied to 106.0applied to 102.2 (excluding the wave)organicTrailingBase, runRateUpliftThe wave does not recur, so it is not rolled forward.
Base organic growth5%6.51%baseCashGrowth, organicRatio2020to2025Sygnity's own 2020–2025 through-cycle organic revenue CAGR (299.7 / 218.7, fifth root) at a constant margin. The parent's organic growth was 13.4% in 2025 and 16.5–16.8% in each first half since 2024, with maintenance +17–23%. Outside view: CSU-family organic 3.4%.
Upside organic growth8%11.0%upsideCashGrowth, parentOrganicGrowthRecentMidpoint of the through-cycle rate and the parent's recent 15.6%.

Return effect at PLN94, 3 November 2026, exits fixed:

HorizonDownsideBaseUpsideWeighted
5 years, before → after1.27% → 0.62%14.14% → 14.73%16.92% → 18.81%11.52% → 12.18%
10 years, before → after3.29% → 2.95%12.48% → 13.24%15.11% → 17.03%10.85% → 11.83%

Step by step for the five-year weighted rate: KPO cliff −0.67, base growth +0.70, upside growth +0.63 points. Probabilities are unchanged.

3 November 2026: bull–bear debate judgment

Fact check: the Polish 10-year yield was 6.31% on 3 Nov 2026, not the 6.47% both advocates used.

InputBeforeAfterNamed stepEvidence and verdict
KPO wave in starting earnings3.85 (H1 plus a 50% Q3 tail)6.06; baseline 115.66 → 113.28kpoWavePretaxQ3Residual, kpoWavePretaxQ3Judged, kpoWavePretaxTrailingThe Q3 subsidiary profit residual (7.0 pretax) contradicts a half-size tail. The residual is an upper estimate, and the known contracts bound the total. Equal weight on both. Split
Base and upside exit18x16.0xbuildUpCostOfEquity, marketImpliedCostOfEquity, judgedCostOfEquity, baseExitMultipleBuild-up r 10.92% (6.31% − 0.72% + 5.33%) and market-implied r 9.98% are averaged to 10.45%, giving Koller (1 − 0.13)/(r − 5%). 18x needed r ≈ 9.8%. Split, leaning bear
Downside exit12.2x (1/9% hurdle with the 2022 trough)11.5xzeroGrowthMultiple, downsideExitMultipleThe same buyer rate applies to every exit. Consistency
Base deal-capacity growth10% (family)3.4%binding to acquiredBusinessGrowthThree flat years; a flat deal count whose cash per deal grows with target earnings. Split
Base organic growth6.51%6.51% (kept)baseCashGrowthThe bull's 7.5% fade averages 5.7% over ten years, and the bear's EU cap exempts defence and covers a third of revenue. Outside view kept
Run-rate roll14%14% (kept)runRateUpliftIt fills a past window with observed growth; the referenced investor's column needs it. Bull
Weights, cash return30/50/20, 35/40/25; 1.56%kept—Several attacks survive; the cash yield is measured

Return effect at PLN94, 3 November 2026, exits fixed:

HorizonDownsideBaseUpsideWeighted
5 years, before → after0.62% → −0.59%14.73% → 11.86%18.81% → 16.06%12.18% → 9.69%
10 years, before → after2.95% → 2.43%13.24% → 11.53%17.03% → 15.75%11.83% → 10.50%

Step by step for the five-year weighted rate: KPO wave −0.40, deal capacity −0.16, base and upside exit −1.76, downside exit −0.17 points. The weights were reassessed and kept (11-scenario-probabilities.md). Prospective checks were added for the Q3 subsidiary profit, the PLN yield, calendar-2027 deal cash, a June 2027 payout and a TSS tender.

3 November 2026: revenue build (yearly paths)

The owner's instruction: an IRR must come from financial projections, with each assumption stated year by year. The model now uses the shared revenue build (revenueBuild, inputs.yearly).

InputBefore (scalar)After (yearly path)Named step or source
Starting revenuenone492.2 = (443.5 trailing − 18.5 KPO) × 1.080 + g.on 29.8 + Mednow 3.3startingRevenue, kpoWaveRevenue, gonRevenueEstimate
Starting marginimplicit23.0% = 113.3 / 492.2; KPO wave 18.5 of revenue at 32.8%startingMargin, kpoWaveMargin
Organic growth, base6.51% constant9.5% (yr 1) · 7% (yrs 2–3) · 5.5% (yrs 4–10)baseYear1OrganicGrowth; pl-mof-mtfsp; sgn-h126
Organic growth, upside / downside11.0% / 0%13 / 11 / 9% · −2% then 0%path reasons
Organic marginimplicit, constantbase 23.0%; upside 23.5% from yr 3; downside 21.5% from yr 2startingMargin; sgn-fy24
Deal price6.61x cash1.06x revenue at a 16.2% acquired margin (6.6x cash)ownDealPriceToSales, acquiredMarginOwnDeals
Acquired growth3.4%0% (yrs 1–2), then 3.4%sgn-h126; acquiredBusinessGrowth

Calibration: with constant paths equal to the scalar inputs, the returns matched the debate model exactly (5-year −0.59/11.86/16.06%, 9.69% weighted).

Return effect at PLN94, 3 Nov 2026, exits fixed:

HorizonDownsideBaseUpsideWeighted
5 years, before → after−0.59% → −2.08%11.86% → 12.28%16.06% → 16.18%9.69% → 9.65%
10 years, before → after2.43% → 1.63%11.53% → 11.40%15.75% → 15.11%10.50% → 10.07%

Five-year weighted attribution: organic growth paths +0.06, margin paths −0.12, acquired margin and price +0.02, acquired growth 0.00 points. The ten-year rate falls 0.43 points, mainly from the fading growth (−0.42).

4 November 2026: yearly deal budget

Deal cash is now stated per year (deploymentCapacity.basis: 'yearly-path'). deploymentGrowth is dropped.

InputBeforeAfterNamed step or evidence
Base deal cash35.7 growing 3.4% (35.7 → 48.3)expected budget 26.3 growing 3.4% (26.3 → 35.5)expectedDealBudget = activeEraMean 35.1 × activeYearFrequency 0.75; no dated lumps without evidenced timing
Downside deal cashnone (rate 0)0 for three years, then 14.0 a year (rate 1)quietRunYears 3; recordMean2021to2025 14.0
Upside deal cash35.7 growing 15%35.7, 44.2, 44.2, 58.4, 58.4, then 95.0stepped 15%
Record measures—mean 14.0 (2021–25), 26.3 (TSS era), 35.1 (active era); best year 2.55x the mean; quiet run 3 yearstssEraMean, activeEraMean, recordBestToMean

A calibration with year-by-year values equal to the smooth cap reproduced the returns exactly.

PLN94, 3 Nov 2026DownsideBaseUpsideWeighted
5 years, before → after−2.08% → −1.83%12.28% → 11.71%16.18% → 16.19%9.65% → 9.39%
10 years, before → after1.63% → 2.12%11.40% → 10.90%15.11% → 15.13%10.07% → 9.94%

The base first used dated quiet years (years 3 and 8: 11.86%, 9.47%). It was corrected the same day to the expected budget, because the timing of quiet years is not evidenced.

10 November 2026: roll to the full Q3 2026 report

The nine-month report (sgn-q326, Polish original, published 10 November) replaces the 2 November provisional bridge.

InputBeforeAfterNamed step or source
Trailing windowJune 2026 (FY2025 + H1 2026 − H1 2025) plus a preliminary-profit Q3 incrementreported September 2026 (FY2025 + 9M 2026 − 9M 2025)the …Ttm steps; sgn-q326 p.11
Normalized owner cash, current-tax definition94.58 (June) + 11.45 provisional Q3 = 106.0397.42 reportednormalizedTrailingOwnerCash
Current tax on excluded working-capital timingnot separated+9.27 (deferred-tax asset on deferred income +5.07; contract-revenue liability −4.20, Sep 2025 to Sep 2026)advanceTaxTiming; sgn-q326 p.20, sgn-q325 note 12.2
September earning power106.03 provisional106.69preliminaryUpdatedOwnerCash
Q3 KPO wavejudged equal-weight mean, 4.31 pretax (trailing wave 6.06 owner cash)measured residual, 9.46 pretax (10.23 owner cash)kpoWavePretaxTrailing now uses kpoWavePretaxQ3Residual; parent Q3 reported (+4.53 ex estimated dividends, against an assumed +6.96)
KPO wave revenue18.5 (Q1 contracts 22.757 gross)65.5 (H1 contracts 80.544 gross, same nine hospitals)kpoWaveRevenue; contradiction between the Q1 and Q3 reports recorded
Anchor run-rate owner cash113.28109.49runRateOwnerCash
Starting revenue / margin492.2 / 23.0%441.4 / 24.8%startingRevenue, startingMargin
Downside margin from year 2 / upside from year 3fixed 21.5% / 23.5%starting margin −1.5 / +0.5 points (23.3% / 25.3%)downsideLaterMargin, upsideLaterMargin
Opening cashJune 225.1 − g.on 31.5 − reserve 71.1 = 122.5September 281.1 − g.on 31.5 − reserve 73.9 = 175.7investableCash; g.on closed 2 Oct (note 35)
Year-one claims6.51 (June payables)9.22 payables + 24.45 advance-build reversal = 33.67knownCashClaims, advanceReversalClaim
Retained claims and assetsJune valuesSeptember: retirement 1.563, litigation 0.538, bond 0.100, JV 0.983, receivables 0.451sgn-q326 pp.9, 27–28

Why each change:

  • Tax timing. On the frozen definition the Q3 bridge missed the provisional estimate by 8.6. Pretax cash before working capital rose 15.4, in line with the 14.2 profit increase. All of the miss was current tax: 13.98 in Q3 against 1.80 a year earlier, while deferred tax credited 7.0. Note 12.2 shows tax charged on customer advances. The bridge excludes the 48.4 working-capital inflow those advances created, so keeping the tax on them was inconsistent. The method requires separating cash tax from deferred-tax timing (docs/method/cash-flow-and-reinvestment.md).
  • Advance reversal. September cash includes the 2026 advance build: contract liabilities were 25.6 in September 2025, 41.3 in December, 55.8 in June and 85.8 in September, during the KPO deadline wave. Deploying that cash as if it were permanent would count it twice once the advances unwind. The after-tax nine-month working-capital inflow (30.18 × 0.81) is a year-one claim. If the advances turn out to be recurring maintenance prepayments, the claim should be released.
  • KPO wave. The frozen debate rule moved the Q3 wave to the measured residual once the reported subsidiary increase (9.65) exceeded 6.5. The parent's Q3 dividends are not split; half of the parent's quarterly other operating income is treated as dividends (parentQ3DividendShare). Bounds of 0 and 1 move the five-year weighted figure by +0.06 and −0.07 points.
  • Relative margins. The downside and upside margins were absolute levels set against a 23.0% start. Removing the lower-margin KPO revenue raises the starting margin, and fixed levels would then have added 3.3 points of downside compression and turned the upside gain into a loss, purely mechanically. The stated reasons describe a 1.5-point compression and a half-point mix gain, so they are now encoded relative to the start. With the old start the encoding gives the old values (23.02% − 1.5 = 21.52%).

Return effect at PLN97, 10 November 2026, exits fixed (old model and new model at the same quote and date):

HorizonDownsideBaseUpsideWeighted
5 years, before → after−2.45% → −2.68%11.05% → 10.30%15.52% → 14.69%8.74% → 8.08%
10 years, before → after1.80% → 1.66%10.57% → 10.20%14.80% → 14.39%9.62% → 9.27%

One-at-a-time reversals of the five-year weighted figure: measured KPO wave −0.59, advance-reversal claim −0.17 and the tax-timing add-back +1.22 points (against the strict definition). The KPO revenue estimate is neutral once margins are relative (+0.01). Weights are unchanged (11-scenario-probabilities.md, 10 November).

Underwriting plan - 27 October 2026

This plan records the business logic and intended assumptions before calculating shareholder IRRs. The work is new underwriting from issuer evidence, not a Harvia-style source-return reproduction.

Opportunity ledger

Added 3 November 2026, after the original 27 October plan below and after returns had been calculated. It tests the existing scenario inputs and changes none of them. Money in PLN millions; all figures are judgments built from the cited facts.

OpportunityStarting pointCustomer need and why Sygnity winsReachable scale in 5 yearsInvestment and cash costTiming and limitsEvidence against
Price on installed systems (indexation and repricing at renewal)servicing 144.2 in 2025; NBP up to about 27 a year; six Ministry of Family 48-month contracts from 2024continuity of statutory and central-bank systems; incumbent code and staffinflation-linked: roughly 3–5% a year on the recurring base, about 25–40 of revenuenone beyond staff already in costsat each renewal (NBP end-2027; ministries 2028)public buyers retender on price; the 2022–2025 repricing may already have taken the slack
Volume: regulatory and functional change requests on own systemsimplementation 189.0, much of it change work on installed systemslegal deadlines (energy market, labour-market reform, NBP needs) leave customers no time to switchfollows legislation; we assume 0–3% a year net of fading programmesdelivery staff at about 0.19 per FTE a year; roughly 6 people per 2.9 of revenuelumpy; Solidarity Shield and CSIRE work is fadingutilities growth of +34% since FY2022 is partly temporary
Share: new tenders and new public systemspublic-sector projects 83 in 2024domain references; price decides at tendernot underwritten as growth; replaces lost or expiring workbid costs, guarantees (13.1 outstanding), fixed-price risk2026–2029 EU and KPO cyclee-Taxes failure; Asseco's scale
Acquired niches: organic growthabout 51 of revenue (Sagra, Edrana, DocLogix, Mednow, g.on)vertical software with maintenanceat 5–8% a year, +15–25 of revenuesmall; working capital in SaaS is lowalready in the baseno post-acquisition results disclosed
Acquisitions34.3 (2024), 35.7 (2025), about 31.5 so far in 2026sellers (founders, Comarch, TSS) get a permanent CSU-family ownerat about 35–52 a year (base cap growing 10%), about 220 deployed over 5 years at 6.61x, adding about 33 of owner cashcash only; no debt or equityeach deal contributes from the year after purchase; integration capacity of one or two deals a yearSygnity's own record is two measurable deals; related-party supply (g.on)
KPO hospital wave (Mednow OPTIMED NXT)nine KPO hospital contracts of 22.8 gross (Q1 2026); subsidiary over-time revenue +35.8 in H1 2026hospitals had to spend recovery funds by the deadlinenone after 2026: projects completed by 15 Jul 2026, spending eligible to 31 Aug 2026delivery staff and licencesends Q3 2026; afterwards maintenance on the installed hospitalsremoved from starting earnings (about 3.8 of owner cash); a Q4 2026 over-time level near Q2's would refute the wave reading
Idle cash225.1 at June 2026; about 75 a year beyond deal spend—600 or more by year five if not usednonepolicy choice for TSS and the AGMno dividend since at least 2021

Scale check five years out (base): existing-business owner cash grows 5% to about 142. At constant conversion that is roughly 570 of existing-business revenue against 443.5 trailing September 2026 (provisional), plus about 150 of revenue from new deals at the 2024 deals' 1.15x price-to-sales, with their own staff. At today's 0.41 revenue per FTE plus 3% a year indexation, the existing business would need about 1,200 staff instead of roughly 860 now, about 7% a year of net hiring. That is feasible in Polish IT but adds to wage pressure. Management targets are not published, so there is no guidance to test against. The base sits below the company's recent revenue growth (+19.5% in 2025; +38% in the first nine months of 2026, provisional), which included repricing and acquisitions.

Scenario mechanisms

Each case is a coherent business outcome. Growth, margin, required capital, deal capacity, financing, dilution and the exit denominator move together and are recorded in valuation/model.json inputNotes.

DownsideBaseUpside
Organic revenue growth (yearly path)year 1 −2%, then 0%year 1 9.5%, years 2–3 7%, years 4–10 5.5% (10-year mean 6.2%)year 1 13%, years 2–3 11%, years 4–10 9%
Organic owner-cash margin (yearly path)23.0% in year 1, then 21.5% (back to the 2024 level as wages outrun indexation and NBP and the ministries reprice)23.0% held (group EBIT 25.5% → 25.2%; repricing done at group level)23.0% in years 1–2, then 23.5% (mix shifts to the higher-margin parent)
Required capitalnone (negative working capital)none beyond expensed staffnone
Deal capacity and priceyearly budget: 0 for three years (the worst dry spell in the record), then 14.0 (2021–2025 mean)yearly budget: 26.3 in year 1, growing 3.4% a year to 35.5 in year 10 (expected budget including quiet-year frequency: active-era pace 35.1 × 0.75); no lump or quiet year is placed in a specific year because no deal timing is evidenced; 1.06x price per zloty of revenue at a 16.2% margin; half a year in the purchase year; acquired revenue flat in years 1–2, then +3.4%yearly budget: 35.7, 44.2, 44.2, 58.4, 58.4, then 95.0 (15% capacity growth); same price and margin
Return on new capital—15.1% entry cash yield15.1%
Financing and dilutionno debt; awards bought back; zero net dilutionsamesame
Unplaced cashretained, earning the measured 1.56% after-tax deposit yield, counted at face valuesamesame
Starting revenue and marginrevenue 441.4 (reported trailing 443.5, less the 65.5 KPO wave, rolled 0.57 years at 14%, plus g.on 29.8 and Mednow 3.3 estimates); owner cash 109.5; margin 24.8% (10 Nov 2026; was 492.2 / 113.3 / 23.0%)samesame
Exit denominator and multiple11.45x normalized after-financing owner cash (judged: 1/r at 10.45% averaged with the 13.3x 2022 trough)15.97x (Koller at r = 10.45%)15.97x: higher growth does not earn a higher multiple

Temporary under-use versus permanent impairment: idle cash is temporary under-use, valued at face and not destroyed. A permanent impairment would be a lost core system or a structural margin reset; those sit in the bear case (05-thesis.md) and the risks register, not in the downside path. Deals are funded from cash before their earnings are recognized. The capacity cap reflects one or two integrations a year, not the cash available.

Outside view (growth-durability review, 3 November). Five-year organic owner-cash growth is 0%, 6.5% and 11.0%. Including deals, base owner cash grows from 115.7 to about 197 in year five, about 11% a year. 6.5% organic is in line with Sygnity's own 2020–2025 through-cycle record. It is twice the CSU-family organic mean (3.4%), which the parent's maintenance growth supports. The upside's 11% for a decade is above what most mature IT-services companies sustain and depends on the parent's recurring growth persisting; it carries a 20–25% weight. The KPO wave is a funding deadline, not demand that recurs, so it is removed rather than extrapolated.

Diagnostic at PLN94 on 3 November, base with no deals: 2% growth at 18x gives 7.9%, 3% gives 8.8% and 4% gives 9.7%. The market price implies about 3.3% organic cash growth at an 18x exit for a 9% return.

Author calibration (3 November): the CSU-family cash P/E table implies 134.7 of calendar-2027 owner cash. The base now gives 132.6 (−1.6%), against 118.7 before.

Business and definition

Regulated banking, public administration and utility customers buy implementations and ongoing servicing of business-critical software. Servicing is a repeat-business anchor, but projects and public procurement remain substantial. Sygnity is not a pure subscription vendor. Product development, implementation staff, subcontractors and incentive compensation remain economic costs.

Use the shared after-financing cash-equity adapter. Normalize trailing consolidated operating cash flow for working-capital and tax-payment timing; deduct sustaining cash investment, cash leases, financing paid outside operating cash and the employee-share addback. Remove income on cash/financial assets valued separately. Do not deduct acquisition amortization again or charge an arbitrary industrial organic ROIIC on top of software costs already expensed.

Use FY2025 + H1 2026 - H1 2025. Keep current taxes, investment cash, employee awards and deposit income separately identifiable. Preserve the actual published CFO bridge before normalization. Employee-share buybacks fund awards; charging the economic award cost means no second future award-buyback charge or free share-count accretion.

Current portfolio and capital

Start from June cash. Subtract the initial EUR7.2m g.on price using the transaction-date NBP EUR/PLN reference rate as an estimated cash payment. Retain an operating reserve equal to one quarter of observed cash operating costs because contract delivery and advance receipts create funding obligations. Reserve cash remains an asset at face value, outside the acquisition budget. No interest on it is capitalized into operating earnings.

Treat the June deferred acquisition payable as a year-one cash claim. Carry reported pension and litigation provisions, the small bond balance and the JV/other financial assets explicitly. Cash leases are charged in earnings; lease principal is not deducted again as a separate terminal debt. No new credit draw is assumed. The PLN80m facility includes a PLN30m guarantee sub-limit and a PLN50m overdraft; a facility limit is neither cash nor a shareholder asset.

The October g.on release discloses a price but not stand-alone owner cash. Mednow is in only seven months of the trailing window. Estimate missing mature cash using a disclosed acquisition-cash proxy, not a one-month December profit annualization. Mark these additions as estimates, not reported earning power or guaranteed synergies. Hold the estimates constant across scenarios until better target evidence is available.

Acquisition economics

DocLogix provides a small, imperfect empirical anchor: a six-month post-purchase net profit contribution, the purchase price, acquired cash, transaction costs and the purchase-price intangible asset balance. Annualize the six-month contribution only as a rough proxy, with explicit seasonality limitations. The lower cash-multiple estimate reverses after-tax acquisition amortization using an estimated eight-year useful life within the disclosed 5-11 year range. The upper estimate gives no cash credit for that amortization. Use the midpoint of these alternative cash definitions for a base purchase multiple. This is not an observed portfolio hurdle or a proof that future deals will earn it.

Set the base deployment fraction so the first modeled year's purchase budget matches FY2025 actual acquisition cash spending, given the current investable cash plus estimated first-year owner cash, after known cash claims. It is a calibration to observed deployment pace, not to an IRR. Keep that fraction fixed thereafter and inspect the resulting annual deal sizes. Faster deployment requires more actual deal capacity, not just available financing. New purchases occur at year-end and earn cash the following year; no early mature earnings is recognized.

Coherent scenarios

CaseExisting-business cash growthNew purchasesExit valuationEconomic interpretation
Downside0%None14x after-financing owner cashProject demand and the acquisition platform stall; cash accumulates, with no unsupported extra permanent margin haircut.
Base5%Fraction calibrated to FY2025 cash deployment; midpoint purchase-cash proxy18xMaintenance, regulatory work and implementations grow more slowly than recent reported results; acquisition discipline and deployment stay near observed capacity.
Upside8%Twice the base initial deployment fraction, same purchase-cash multiple18xStronger product/servicing demand and a broader deal pipeline; no extra terminal re-rating or lower purchase price.

Growth, deployment and terminal valuation are explicit estimates. Recent FY2025 revenue excluding newly acquired companies grew roughly 14%, but that is not a perpetual cash-growth forecast. A 5% base requires continuing product investment already charged to cash earnings. The 18x multiple is a valuation judgment reflecting installed mission-critical software, balanced against project exposure, public-sector procurement and controlling-shareholder risk. It is not copied from Harvia, Lumine or CSU, and not solved from a target return. The 14x downside reflects weaker durability and minority-marketability concerns. Probabilities are not assigned.

Tests before acceptance

Check the published cash balance identity, consolidated versus parent-only accounts, all ownership claims and cash-tax timing. Change one financial observation and confirm the calculation trail changes. Change only the live quote and confirm the operating forecast does not change. Test zero deployment, slower cash growth, an acquisition-price increase, a delay in acquisition contribution, a lower exit multiple, and a separate guarantee-loss stress. No scenario probability or author endorsement is implied by these tests.

Sources: issuer FY2025 consolidated statements; H1 2026 consolidated statements; April 2026 investor presentation; October acquisition release; September facility notice; October reporting-calendar notice; NBP transaction-date FX; competitor Asseco H1 2026 release. Customer contract notices corroborate demand mechanisms, not forecast revenue recognition.

Yearly paths (revenue build, 3 November 2026)

Owner cash is now revenue × margin. Each assumption is stated per year range with its reason and sources in valuation/model.json (cases.*.inputs.yearly); the starting point is in named steps startingRevenue and startingMargin.

Starting point. Trailing October 2025 to September 2026 revenue was 443.5 (FY2025 audited plus the reported 9M 2026, less 9M 2025; the 10 November report confirmed the preliminary figure). The KPO hospital wave is removed as revenue and margin, not only as cash: 65.5 net of VAT (the nine Mednow hospital contracts, 80.5 gross per the Q3 report; the Q1 report had said 22.8 for the same hospitals), carrying 10.2 of owner cash, a 15.6% margin (kpoWaveRevenue, kpoWaveMargin). The rest is rolled 0.57 years at 14% to the anchor. Estimates are then added for g.on (29.8) and Mednow's two pre-consolidation months (3.3), both at Sygnity's own 1.06x price-to-sales. That gives starting revenue of 441.4 against owner cash of 109.5, a 24.8% margin. Before the 10 November roll: 18.5 KPO revenue at 6.06 owner cash, 492.2 revenue, 113.3 owner cash, 23.0%.

PathBase (years: value)Why
Organic growth1: 9.5% · 2–3: 7% · 4–10: 5.5%Year 1 weights the parent (69% of ex-KPO revenue, organic 13.4–16.8% since 2024, maintenance +17–23%, ministry renewals) at 13% against subsidiaries at 2% (point-in-time revenue flat in H1 2026). Years 2–3 fade under the EU deficit procedure's net-expenditure path (4.0% in 2027, 3.5% in 2028; defence exempt) and the NBP renewal due in December 2027. Years 4–10 are long-run growth just below the 6.51% through-cycle rate. The 10-year mean is 6.2%.
Organic margin1–10: starting margin, 24.8% since 10 Nov (was 23.0%)Group EBIT margin was flat at 25.5% (2025) and 25.2% (H1 2026). The parent is still rising (core 26.1% → 32.6%), but low-margin acquired units offset it. Wage growth (+5.3% per FTE) is passed into renewals.
Price per zloty of acquired revenue1–10: 1.06xOwn deals net of cash: Edrana 0.63x, Sagra 1.43x, DocLogix 0.69x. At the acquired margin this is 6.6x cash, the CSU-family aggregate.
Acquired margin1–10: 16.2%Edrana 15.8% and Sagra 16.4% first-year net margins; DocLogix 7.9%; subsidiaries about 14% after tax in H1 2026, against the parent's 32.6% core margin.
Deal budget1: 26.3, growing 3.4% a year to 35.5 in year 10Expected budget including quiet-year frequency. Deal cash was 0, 0, 0, 34.3 and 35.7 (2021–25), plus 35.1 so far in 2026. The active-era pace (35.1) is multiplied by the TSS-era active-year frequency (0.75) and grown at the 3.4% verdict. No deal has been announced, signed or financed, so no lump is put in a specific year. g.on was paid before the anchor.
Acquired growth1–2: 0% · 3–10: 3.4%Subsidiaries' point-in-time revenue was flat in H1 2026; after that the CSU-family organic mean.

Base rows, years 1–5 (revenue / organic / acquired / margin / owner cash): 555.8 / 538.9 / 16.9 / 22.8% / 128.7; 627.9 / 576.6 / 51.3 / 22.5% / 144.3; 704.9 / 617.0 / 87.9 / 22.2% / 161.2; 778.0 / 650.9 / 127.1 / 21.9% / 177.2; 855.5 / 686.7 / 168.7 / 21.7% / 194.3. The blended margin falls because acquired revenue earns 16.2%.

Calibration: constant paths equal to the previous scalar inputs (the margin at 23.0%, acquired margin at 23.0%, price-to-sales at 6.61 × 23.0%) reproduced the debate model exactly: five-year −0.59/11.86/16.06%, 9.69% weighted.

Method self-evaluation - 27 October 2026

The economic plan was saved before the first return calculation. The analysis uses Sygnity's own consolidated financials, delivery/servicing mix and incentive/funding structure.

Source and accounting checks

The FY2025 and H1 cash statements reconcile from opening to closing cash, including investing, financing and translation. The model uses consolidated cash, rather than the parent-only cash statement containing subsidiary dividends. The original Polish table confirms the Mednow purchase allocation is in PLN thousand despite English prose saying EUR. Statutory revenue tables take precedence over presentation sub-bars that do not sum to their headline.

The latest Mednow allocation is used, with the original provisional value left in the source record. Acquisition-year timing is respected: DocLogix is effectively fully consolidated in the current trailing window, Mednow has seven months, and g.on is absent. Known-target missing cash is estimated separately rather than treating a closing-month profit as a full-year run-rate.

The owner-cash bridge retains employee incentive cost, actual capital purchases, leases and tax. Changing the compensation observation reduces cash through the calculation trail without reducing the share count for free. Operating reserves, legacy taxes/payables, financial assets, claims and contingent guarantees have separate treatment. Facility limits are not assumed cash.

Economic tests at one fixed price/date

All results below use PLN90.90, 27 October 2026, and a 27 October 2031 exit. They are single-variable diagnostics around the recorded base. They are not probabilities, confidence limits or source-author forecasts.

CounterfactualEstimated five-year XIRRWhat it tests
Recorded base12.18%Current-portfolio cash grows 5%; purchases start near observed cash spending.
No future acquisitions8.29%Cash alone does not guarantee an opportunity set.
No organic cash growth8.05%The base depends on existing products and delivery economics too.
New purchases cost 50% more per cash euro10.24%Available money is not the same as attractive purchase returns.
New purchases contribute one additional year later10.98%No free mature cash before the investment contributes.
Exit multiple 14x rather than 18x7.56%Terminal judgment is material.
Full PLN13.078m guarantee cash call in year one12.00%Contingent cash risk, without pretending it measures consequential business damage.
Remove both estimated current-target additions10.94%Unreported target earning power is not silently treated as known.

Changing only the share price preserves forecast rows. Missing compensation evidence, source references and model inputs are validated. The company uses the existing shared cash-equity and XIRR engines; no company-specific executable valuation code was added.

Limits and next evidence

The purchase-cash proxy rests on a six-month DocLogix result and an estimated amortization life. Tax timing, current-target profitability, future project cash needs and deployment capacity can all differ. The forecast gives actual first-/last-year purchase budgets so that sourcing requirements are visible: base approximately PLN35.7m to PLN88.9m, upside PLN72.4m to PLN156.4m. A finite history does not prove that expansion can continue.

The downside is a coherent stalled-growth/deployment case, not a bound on loss. A permanent software impairment, dilution, unfair related-party deal or collapsing project margin can be worse and needs separate evidence. Base and upside retain the same purchase and terminal multiples, preventing an unsupported extra re-rating from manufacturing the favorable result.

Issuer releases, the financial statements, business/product pages and a competitor release were read. Some PGE/customer pages timed out, and no comprehensive current customer-budget survey or g.on stand-alone filing review is claimed. Q3 results on 10 November are the next confirmed event to replace current proxies.

Capital productivity and reinvestment

Money is in PLN millions. These calculations use the researched scenarios and the shared forecast ledger. They are forward diagnostics, not independently measured historical ROIIC or realized acquisition IRRs. Local sensitivities may differ.

PeriodScenarioCapital return / proxyPeriod-weighted reinvestmentNew growth capitalMatching earnings
5 yearsdownside15.3%5.2%28.031542.912
5 yearsbase15.3%18.4%140.724765.707
5 yearsupside15.3%27.2%240.936884.568
10 yearsdownside15.3%8.4%98.1091162.796
10 yearsbase15.3%15.8%307.0551940.120
10 yearsupside15.3%27.8%715.9362578.506

Updated 10 Nov 2026 after the Q3 roll (anchor run rate 109.5 after the measured 10.2 KPO wave). Deal budgets are unchanged, so new growth capital is unchanged; matching earnings are about 3% lower.

Deal cash is a stated yearly budget (4 Nov 2026). The base uses the expected budget (26.3 growing 3.4%), which prices quiet years in without dating them; the downside is dry for three years, then deploys 14.0 a year.

Revenue build (3 Nov 2026): the deal return proxy is now the acquired margin (16.2%) divided by price-to-sales (1.06x), 15.3%, and base deal capacity grows 3.4% a year (debate judgment).

Return definition: Acquisition ROIIC · mature cash proxy. Numerator 33.023 / denominator 218.172. Earnings basis: After-financing common-owner cash, after ongoing operating investment. The forecast runs from 2026-10-27 to 2031-10-27; a ten-year selection uses its own summed ledger. No historical lagged ROIIC is claimed; the CSU-family 2020–2025 aggregate acquisition yield that sets the purchase multiple is in valuation/calculations.json (aggregate steps).

Average period reinvestment is total new growth investment / total matching earnings, not the arithmetic mean of annual rates. The base available-cash deployment control is 14.9%; annual purchases are also capped by the observed deal capacity, growing at the scenario's capacity growth, so the 27.1% five-year weighted rate is lower than an uncapped forecast. Matching earnings now include interest on retained cash. Old acquisition claims, dividends, debt repayment and financial stakes do not acquire a second increment of operating profit.

Five-year base funding: cash generated before new investment 787.510, less distributions 0.000, less old claims 6.507, plus opening cash drawn / (cash built) -640.280, plus net borrowing / (deleveraging) 0.000. This funds growth capital 140.724 and separately funded financial stakes 0.000. Reconciliation error is below 0.000001.

New-cohort earnings at exit / period investment: 15.9% (cohorts are flat for two years, then grow 3.4% a year).

Limits:

  • A mature acquisition cash yield is a model proxy, not measured cohort ROIIC or a discounted project IRR. Previously funded acquisition claims and opening portfolio ramp are not new investments.
  • Organic product/development investment is embedded in expenses and not separated. The rate shown measures external acquisition reinvestment; it is not total economic reinvestment.
  • These are period-specific forecast diagnostics, not independently measured historical ROIIC or a project XIRR. A matched multi-year lagged capital/earnings history remains a separate research requirement.

Definitions and original methodology links are in docs/method/cash-flow-and-reinvestment.md; source locators are in this company’s registry. Probabilities are separate judgments recorded in research/11-scenario-probabilities.md.

Scenario probabilities

Assessment date: 2026-10-27. These are initial subjective judgments, with low confidence. Financial sources support the mechanisms, not measured numerical odds. The original authors did not provide or endorse these weights.

HorizonDownsideBaseUpside
5 years30%50%20%
10 years35%40%25%

5-year reasoning: Installed software and servicing contracts support cash durability, but project concentration, control/related-party issues and sparse target cash data limit confidence in both organic growth and acquisition deployment.

10-year reasoning: Longer customer/product transitions and a larger deployment opportunity set widen outcomes. Lower central weight reflects weaker visibility into a decade of purchases and minority-holder economics.

Downside: Tender timing, weaker project conversion or governance concerns can stall growth and acquisitions. Cash retention limits this representative loss path, but severe contract or capital-allocation damage can be worse.

Base: Existing servicing/development demand supports 5% after-spending cash growth. Base purchases begin near the reported annual deployment amount rather than assuming every available zloty finds a suitable target.

Upside: Stronger product growth and a more productive acquisition pipeline support the 8% growth/twice-deployment case. The limited transaction sample and related-party safeguards limit its current weight.

Review triggers:

  • Servicing recurrence, tender pipeline and project cash conversion.
  • Reported g.on/Mednow/DocLogix cash and updated purchase allocations.
  • Independent deal terms, minority rights and actual deployment.

Each path represents a broad outcome region, not the probability of hitting an exact share price or IRR. Paths are a coarse approximation of a continuous joint distribution; the displayed downside and upside are not bounds. Joint driver dependencies must be considered, rather than multiplying marginal driver guesses. Scenario weights sum to 100% within this approximation. Severe outcomes remain possible outside the modeled paths.

Price movement alone does not change these weights. A changed causal premise, acquisition capacity, financial report or scenario definition does. Local assumption sensitivities suspend the researched weights until the full distribution is reassessed. No weighted-average IRR is presented as an expected shareholder return.

Sources: sgn-fy25, sgn-h126, sgn-gon, sgn-asseco-h126. Method: Damodaran, chapter 33, printed pp.894-897. See valuation/model.json for machine-readable weights and docs/method/cash-flow-and-reinvestment.md for the capital definitions.

2 November 2026 review

Weights unchanged. Stronger preliminary Q3 profit raises the provisional earning-power base in every path, but it doesn't settle cash conversion, implementation lumpiness, target economics or controlling-shareholder risk. A four-number release can't support a finer numerical odds revision. Reassess after the 10 November statements.

3 November 2026 review

Scenario definitions changed: deals are priced at the CSU-family aggregate and capped at the observed pace, with capacity growth of 0%/10%/15%. The upside no longer deploys a doubled resource fraction without limit. Weights are reassessed and kept, because the change constrains every path rather than shifting their relative likelihood.

3 November 2026 pipeline review

Weights unchanged at 30/50/20 (5 years) and 35/40/25 (10 years). The five-year filings support the mechanisms behind each path:

  • Downside: cash accumulates without deployment, the pattern of 2021–2023.
  • Base: deals at the observed flat pace, with a held margin.
  • Upside: a faster pace, which has not yet been observed.

They don't justify a finer numerical change. The bear mechanism in 05-thesis.md (margin back to about 21%, no deals, 12x; −4.5% over 5 years) lies below the downside path. It is a tail inside the downside region's 30% weight, not a fourth weighted path. Price changes alone do not move the weights.

3 November 2026: author calibration

Scenario definitions changed in every path:

  • the starting point is the anchor run rate;
  • deals earn half a year when bought;
  • retained cash earns 1.56% after tax;
  • acquired businesses grow 3.4%;
  • the downside exit is 12.2x.

These are measurement and timing corrections common to all paths. They don't shift the relative likelihood of the business outcomes, so the weights were reassessed and kept at 30/50/20 (5 years) and 35/40/25 (10 years). The Q3 report on 10 November is the next trigger.

3 November 2026: growth-durability review

Weights kept at 30/50/20 and 35/40/25. The review split H1 2026 growth into the parent's durable organic growth, which supports a higher base and upside, and a KPO deadline wave inside Mednow, which is removed from every path. Neither finding changes which business outcome is more likely relative to the others; both change the level of every path. The upside's 11% organic growth sits above outside-view base rates, which argues against raising its weight. The 10 November Q3 report is the next trigger.

3 November 2026: bull–bear debate judgment

Weights kept at 30/50/20 (5 years) and 35/40/25 (10 years). The judgment (12-debate.md) changed the scenario definitions:

  • the base and upside exit is 16.0x, and the downside 11.5x, at a 10.45% market cost of equity;
  • base deal-capacity growth is 3.4%;
  • the KPO wave removed from every path is 6.06.

These change the level of the paths more than their relative likelihood, so the weights were reassessed rather than carried over.

  • Bull's 25/50/25 and 30/45/25: rejected. The attacks that survived rebuttal (cost of equity, KPO size, a floor-price tender) argue against more upside weight. The 11% upside already exceeds outside-view base rates.
  • Bear's 40/45/15: withdrawn by the bear as an unsupported judgment. Measured parent organic growth argues against more downside weight.
  • The unresolved tender tail is the reason the downside weight is not lowered.

Next trigger: the 10 November Q3 report.

3 November 2026: revenue build

Weights kept at 30/50/20 and 35/40/25. The paths now state revenue and margin per year. The downside gained an explicit margin decline (the bear's mechanism), and the base fades its growth. These restate the same three business outcomes in more detail; they do not change their relative likelihood.

4 November 2026: lumpy deal budget

Weights kept. The yearly deal budget states the record's lumpiness inside each path: quiet years in the base, and a three-year dry spell in the downside. It does not change the relative likelihood of the three outcomes.

10 November 2026: Q3 report

Weights kept at 30/50/20 and 35/40/25, reviewed against the nine-month report. The roll changed the level of every path (measured KPO wave, reported cash and claims), not their relative likelihood. Evidence that could move the weights, in both directions:

  • Against the upside: the parent's Q3 revenue grew 9.1%, against about 16.8% in H1 (nine months +14.0%). The upside's year-one 13% organic growth leans on the recent parent pace. One quarter after a deadline-driven H1 is not a trend, so the weight is not cut yet. A second quarter below 10% (FY2026 report) would be the trigger.
  • Against the downside: pretax cash matched profit, no new contingent liability appeared (the 8.2 public-client contingency was settled for 0.5), and the main lawsuit is in mediation with both proceedings suspended.
  • Unresolved: whether the 85.8 advance balance is KPO timing or recurring prepayment. This is held in the paths as a claim, not in the weights.

No numerical odds come from the report. These remain subjective judgments. Next trigger: the FY2026 annual report.

Bull–bear debate (3 November 2026, PLN94)

Run under prompts/debate.md after the valuation stage. The bull and bear advocates wrote their cases separately, then cross-examined each other. A judge who did not build the base case decided each contested point. The advocates' working papers (sygnity-bull.md, sygnity-bear.md and their rebuttals) are local scratch files and are not tracked. This page summarizes them. All returns come from the shared engine at PLN94 on 3 November 2026, with exits fixed at 27 Oct 2031 and 2036. Before the debate the model gave 0.62/14.73/18.81% at five years (12.18% weighted) and 2.95/13.24/17.03% at ten (11.83% weighted).

Bull case

The bull steelmanned the bear first: the 2022–2025 margin step was a one-off, wages rise about 8% a year, two-thirds of H1 2026 growth was acquired, and a controller hoards cash. His opening case then had five claims:

  1. Organic growth of 8.5%, not 6.51%. The 2020–2025 window starts in the creditor restructuring. The parent company, which holds no acquisitions, grew 13.4% in 2025 and 16.5–16.8% in each first half since 2024. Its maintenance grew 17.4% and 23% (parentRevenue*, parentMaintenance*; sgn-h126 p.44, FY2025 JSF p.28). NBP raised the ZSK ceiling by 25 gross (sgn-nbp-contract). There were 37 public awards worth 195 gross (mimira-awards). The mechanism is legislation-forced change requests on systems the customer can't switch.
  2. A 20x exit. NBP cut rates to 3.75%. Sygnity's own ex-cash multiples were 21.6–24.0x in 2023–2025 (peExCash2023–2025), and Asseco trades at 24.2x (asseco-pe-aggregator).
  3. A 40% payout. The AGM reserved profit for "dividends and investment", and Topicus has paid a special dividend.
  4. A 2.8% after-tax return on cash instead of the measured 1.56%.
  5. Weights of 20/55/25 at five years, because the record shows a deal every year since 2024 and parent growth every period.

Combined, these gave a 5-year weighted return of 16.9%. The bull conceded up front the flat deal pace, the 6.61x deal price, a held (not expanding) margin, no take-private premium and removal of the KPO wave.

Bear case

The bear steelmanned the bull's installed-base franchise and said permanent loss is hard to construct with 194 of net cash. His case was that several optimistic choices stack:

  1. Q3 was the KPO peak, not a tail. The preliminary Q3 shows revenue up 38.2 and pretax up 14.2 (pbtQ3Change; sgn-9m26-preliminary). Projects had to be complete by 15 July (kpo-d112-schedule). Taking out the parent's H1 pace and a Mednow base leaves about 6 of Q3 pretax, against the 1.6 assumed. Wave: 7.4, not 3.85.
  2. Roll the run rate at 6.51%, not 14% (runRateUplift): −4.4 of owner cash.
  3. The EU deficit procedure caps public spending growth at 4.4%, 4.0% and 3.5% for 2026–28. Base growth: 3.5%.
  4. An 18x exit needs a cost of equity below Poland's. 6.47% 10-year yield (15 Sep 2026) plus Damodaran's 5.33% ERP gives about 11.8%, and the thesis's own Koller formula then gives 12.8–14.5x.
  5. Deals. The pace is flat (34.3, 35.7, about 31.5), so capacity growth is 0%. g.on (a related-party purchase) has no stand-alone financials. 9.04x is the upper bound of the DocLogix price.
  6. Cash trapped under a controller: a 25% haircut, and a tender at the art.79 floor (about PLN80–84) returning −6.6% a year.
  7. Weights of 40/45/15.

Combined (1+2+3+4+5a), these gave 6.67% base and 6.08% weighted over five years.

Rebuttals

Cross-examination narrowed both cases.

  • Bull concessions. The 20x exit was withdrawn once the long rate was shown to have risen. The 40% payout was withdrawn: no dividend since 2021, two AGMs without one. Growth was cut to 7.5% (a 12/9/7/5/4 fade from the parent's 16.8%). Weights were cut to 25/50/25 and 30/45/25. The KPO wave was accepted at the midpoint, 5.6. Deployment growth was accepted at 5%.
  • Bull rebuttals. The roll fills a past window, so observed growth belongs there, not the forward rate. The EU cap applies to total expenditure, and defence has been exempt under the national escape clause since July 2025. The bear's 11.8% counts country risk twice. The tender is voluntary: squeeze-out needs 95% (art.82), and Barca's 9.01% blocks it.
  • Bear concessions. Growth rose to 5.0%, since parent maintenance is measured evidence. The cash haircut and the 40/45/15 weights were dropped as unsupported judgments. The 9.04x deal price was not defended.
  • Bear rebuttals. The parent window coincides with temporary utility programmes (06-risks.md item 7). The NBP annex ends in December 2027. The policy rate is the wrong duration for valuing equity. Asseco's multiple is unreconciled and moved from 17.7x to 24.2x in one quarter. Flat means 0%, not 5%.
  • Where they ended. The revised bull case gave 15.16% base and 13.17% weighted at five years. The revised bear case gave 7.85% base and 6.69% weighted, or 8.01% weighted at a 16x exit.

Judgment

Fact check. Both advocates used a stale shared fact. The Polish 10-year yield was 6.31% on 3 November 2026, not 6.47% (te-pl10y). The remaining checks:

  • Damodaran (January 2026), Poland: total ERP 5.33%, made of a 4.23% mature premium and a 1.10% country premium. The sovereign default spread is 0.72% (damodaran-ctryprem). His local-currency method subtracts the default spread from the local bond yield (damodaran-riskfree). So the bull is right that the bear double-counted, but only by the 0.72 points of default spread, not the whole premium.
  • Asseco: aggregators range from 9x to 24x depending on the denominator. The figure is unusable as an anchor for either side.
  • EU deficit procedure: net-expenditure path 4.4/4.0/3.5% for 2026–28 (pl-mof-mtfsp). The procedure is open. The defence escape clause was adopted on 8 July 2025 (council-nec-2025). Both are verified.
  • Public Offering Act: arts. 73, 79, 82 and 91 as recorded (polish-public-offering-act).
  • Parent growth: the facts reproduce +13.4%, +16.5% and +16.8% for revenue, and +17.4% and +23.3% for maintenance.
  • NBP reference rate: 3.75%, held through September 2026.
#ClaimBullBearEvidenceVerdictReason
1Base organic growth7.5% (fade from 16.8%)5.0% (EDP ceiling)Parent organic growth is measured. The fade path is asserted. The engine applies one rate to both horizons. The EU cap is an aggregate ceiling that exempts defenceSplit: keep 6.51%The bull's own path averages 7.4% over five years and 5.7% over ten; 6.51% sits between. The bear's cap covers a third of revenue and didn't stop public revenue growing 28% under the same procedure. Balanced evidence keeps the outside view, which is Sygnity's own through-cycle rate
2Exit multiple18x14.5–16x (r ≈ 11.8%)Build-up r = 6.31 − 0.72 + 5.33 = 10.92% (Koller 14.7x). The market paid 17.5x on 3 Nov, which implies r = 9.98%. Own history 13.3–24x, but 2023–25 came with 20–35% growth. Asseco unusableSplit, leaning bear: 16.0x (baseExitMultiple)18x needs r ≈ 9.8%, below both estimates. The two estimates of the buyer's rate are weighted equally, giving r = 10.45%. That r also applies to the downside: 1/r = 9.6x, so the downside exit is 11.5x (was 12.2x)
3KPO wave in starting earnings5.67.4The Q3 subsidiary residual after the parent's H1 pace, the new Mednow PPA charge and the Mednow base is 7.0 pretax, against a 1.6 tail. The deadline makes Q3 a peak. The known contracts (22.8 gross, about 18.5 net) bound the total. The parent's Q3 pace is assumedSplit: 6.06 (kpoWavePretaxQ3Judged)The evidence contradicts a half-size tail (bear). The residual is an upper estimate, since it also absorbs subsidiary organic growth and any parent acceleration, and 9.1 pretax would be a 49% margin on the known contracts. The two estimates are weighted equally until the 10 Nov notes
5Base deployment growth5%0%Three flat years: 34.3, 35.7, about 31.5. The family rate is 10%. More platforms is an asserted mechanismSplit, mechanism-based: 3.4% (acquiredBusinessGrowth)The record supports a flat deal count, not 10% growth. A zero nominal rate for ten years would shrink the real pace. With a constant count and multiple, cash per deal grows with target earnings (the family's 3.4% organic rate). Upside keeps 15%
6EU deficit cap and defence exemptionthe cap doesn't bind Sygnitya 3.5% ceilingVerified as aboveBull on the mechanism; no inputThe ceiling applies to total net expenditure and exempts defence. It still limits civil budget growth to about 4% through 2028, which argues against going above the through-cycle rate. Recorded as a reason for verdict 1
7Tender floor versus refusal and squeeze-outrefusal blocks it−6.6% pathArts. 73, 79, 82, 91. TSS already holds more than 50%, so any tender is voluntary. Delisting needs 9/10 of votes cast with Barca presentUnresolved; no inputNot a forced outcome while Barca holds 9.01%. It is still a coercive tail: a tender at the floor after a drawdown, with a delisting threat. It stays inside the downside weight, which is therefore not lowered
8Weights25/50/25; 30/45/25recorded (40/45/15 withdrawn)Several attacks survive (see Conviction)Keep 30/50/20; 35/40/25The surviving attacks argue against raising the upside weight. Parent evidence argues against raising the downside weight
9Cash return2.8%measured 1.56%H1 2026 deposits yielded 1.92% pre-taxBearMeasured, not hypothetical. +0.14 points if changed
10Deal price 9.04x; g.on value; payout———6.61x kept; g.on unresolved; payout withdrawn9.04x is a definitional bound, not a price. g.on lacks data rather than having contrary data. A payout is a prospective check at the June 2027 AGM

Model effect (PLN94, 3 Nov 2026, exits fixed; five-year weighted change in brackets):

Step5-year d/b/u, weighted10-year d/b/u, weighted
Before0.62 / 14.73 / 18.81, 12.182.95 / 13.24 / 17.03, 11.83
KPO wave 3.85 → 6.06 (baseline 115.7 → 113.3)0.24 / 14.33 / 18.38, 11.78 (−0.40)2.75 / 13.06 / 16.83, 11.64
Base deployment growth 10% → 3.4%0.24 / 14.03 / 18.38, 11.62 (−0.16)2.75 / 12.50 / 16.83, 11.40
Base and upside exit 18x → 16.0x0.24 / 11.86 / 16.06, 9.86 (−1.76)2.75 / 11.53 / 15.75, 10.56
Downside exit 12.2x → 11.5x (after)−0.59 / 11.86 / 16.06, 9.69 (−0.17)2.43 / 11.53 / 15.75, 10.50

Single-claim sensitivities around the judged model (5-year weighted 9.69%):

  • exit 14.7x (build-up r only): 8.53%;
  • exit 17.5x (market-implied r only): 11.02%;
  • growth 5.0%: 9.03%;
  • growth 7.5%: 10.13%;
  • KPO wave 7.4: 9.45%;
  • roll at 6.51%: 8.96%;
  • the bull's weights: 10.46%.

Even the bull's weights would leave it below 12%. Named steps are in valuation/calculations.json, inputs and reasons in valuation/model.json inputNotes, and the record in updates/2026-11-03-debate-judgment.md.

Conviction

Attacks that survived rebuttal:

  1. Exit multiple and cost of equity (bear). The verified 6.31% PLN 10-year yield and a correctly built 10.9% cost of equity put the Koller value at 14.7x. Only the market's own 17.5x supports more. This is the largest single driver: about 1.8 points of five-year weighted return.
  2. The size of the KPO wave (bear, partly). Q3 profit contradicts a half-size tail. The true wave is 4–7 of owner cash and is unknown until 10 November.
  3. Deal capacity (bear, partly). Three flat years; the family's 10% growth has not been shown at Sygnity.
  4. A controller tender at the floor (bear, as a tail). Not forced, but available to TSS after a drawdown. It caps the minority's upside at a negotiated premium.
  5. Near-term organic momentum (bull). Parent growth of 13–17%, measured and organic, survived the bear's attacks on its duration but not on its level. It is the main reason the base is not lower.

Conviction: low to moderate. The business case survives: an installed-base franchise, measured organic growth, net cash and no plausible permanent loss in the representative paths. The investment case does not survive at PLN94. The judged 5-year weighted return is 9.7% (10.5% at ten years), below a 12% hurdle. The exit-multiple attack was rebutted only by pointing to today's price, which can't be the evidence that the price is cheap.

What would change it: the 10 November Q3 report. Parent nine-month organic growth of at least 15%, with subsidiaries' Q3 profit showing the KPO wave was near the 3.85 tail, would restore about 0.4 points and support the bull on growth. Even then the cost-of-equity verdict leaves the weighted return near 10%. On the same model, the five-year weighted return reaches 12% at about PLN85 and 13.3% at PLN80, which is around the art.79 floor area. A durable fall in Polish long yields towards 5% would lower the build-up cost of equity. Either would make the case investable; neither would raise conviction in the business itself.

After the judgment: revenue build (3 November 2026)

The judged verdicts are kept, and the model now projects revenue and margin year by year (08-underwriting-plan.md, Yearly paths). A calibration with constant paths reproduced the judged figures exactly: 5-year −0.59/11.86/16.06%, 9.69% weighted.

The revenue build then exposed three things the scalar engine hid:

  • Organic growth fades instead of staying constant. The base runs 9.5% / 7% / 5.5%, with a 10-year mean of 6.2% against the judged 6.51%. Verdict 1's through-cycle anchor is kept as the long-run level. The deficit-procedure ceiling (claim 6) is the stated reason for the years 2–3 fade.
  • Acquired businesses earn 16.2%, not the group's 23%. At 1.06x revenue that is 6.6x cash, so the judged deal price stands.
  • The downside now carries a margin decline to 21.5% from year 2. This is the bear's margin-regression mechanism, stated explicitly.

New returns at PLN94: 5-year −2.08 / 12.28 / 16.18%, 9.65% weighted; 10-year 1.63 / 11.40 / 15.11%, 10.07% weighted. The conviction rating above is unchanged.

After the judgment: lumpy deal budget (4 November 2026)

The engine now takes a stated yearly deal budget. Measured record: 0, 0, 0, 34.3 and 35.7 (2021–25), and 35.1 so far in 2026. The 2021–25 mean is 14.0, and the best year is 2.55 times the mean. The TSS-era mean is 26.3, the active-era mean 35.1, and the longest quiet run three years.

The budget refines the 3.4% capacity-growth verdict rather than replacing it. The base uses the expected budget including quiet-year frequency: the active-era pace (35.1) × the TSS-era active-year frequency (0.75) = 26.3, grown at the 3.4% verdict. No lump or quiet year is placed in a specific year, because no deal timing is evidenced (rule in prompts/stages/08-forecast.md). An earlier draft put quiet years in years 3 and 8 and gave 11.86% / 9.47%; that draft was replaced. The downside repeats the three-year dry spell, then deploys the record mean.

A calibration with the smooth path reproduced the earlier figures exactly. New returns at PLN94: 5-year −1.83 / 11.71 / 16.19%, 9.39% weighted; 10-year 2.12 / 10.90 / 15.13%, 9.94% weighted.

Public source library

Primary filings, investor communications, and industry evidence.

primary

Sygnity H1 2026 consolidated and separate statements ↗

Consolidated section only: pp.9-13 statements; p.18 revenue; p.20 interest/tax; p.23 updated Mednow allocation; pp.26-33 shares/claims/incentives. Header says PLN thousand; some English table labels incorrectly say EUR.

Published Sep 3, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

Sygnity H1 2026 original Polish statements ↗

Original-language cross-check of units and consolidated statements. English prose contains erroneous EUR labels in the Mednow PPA; the underlying tables are PLN thousand.

Published Sep 3, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

Sygnity FY2025 investor presentation ↗

Slides 6-10 visually inspected: organic/acquired revenue, sectors, maintenance versus implementation and cash. Slide 8 implementation sub-bars do not add to the headline; use statutory revenue tables for numerical inputs.

Published Apr 22, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

g.on acquisition from controlling shareholder ↗

One-page release: wholly owned Tessara Blue buys 100% of g.on from TSS Europe; initial EUR7.2m subject to post-close settlement. Target earning power and acquired cash are not disclosed.

Published Oct 2, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

Sygnity credit-facility amendment ↗

PLN80m total: PLN50m overdraft plus PLN30m guarantees, subject to conditions. No new drawing is reported here.

Published Sep 7, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

Sygnity issuer reports and announcements ↗

Polish page checked 10 November 2026: current reports through 29/2026 and the nine-month 2026 periodic report (posted 10 November). October g.on and reporting-date notices read.

Reviewed Nov 10, 2026
primary

Sygnity business, history and management ↗

Business-critical software, implementation and maintenance; TSS control since 2022; 2018 restructuring; management and controlling-shareholder background.

Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

Competitor Asseco first-half 2026 results ↗

Poland segment growth, recurring servicing, public/healthcare digitalisation and competitive capacity. Context for sector demand; does not establish Sygnity market share.

Published Aug 27, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

NBP EUR/PLN table A on acquisition date ↗

Table 192/A/NBP/2026, EUR mid 4.3745 PLN. Transaction-date translation proxy, not the issuer actual booked/payment rate.

Published Oct 2, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

CSU Q2 2026 shareholder report and interim financial statements ↗

PDF pp. 13 FCFA2S; 15 ownership cash; 17 liquidity; 27 balance sheet; 32 cash flows; 35–40 acquisitions; 42–44 investments; 46–50 debt; 52 financing and shares; 54 claims; 55–59 NCI and subsequent events. Printed page numbers are one lower.

Published Aug 11, 2026 · Reviewed Oct 27, 2026
primary

Sygnity annual report calendar 2024 (consolidated statements) ↗

Consolidated Financial Statements.pdf: PDF p.5 income statement, p.9 cash flows, p.35 costs by type, pp.44-45 Edrana Baltic and Sagra acquisitions and goodwill, pp.62-63 note 44 calendar-2023 comparable statements.

Published Apr 30, 2025 · Reviewed Nov 3, 2026
primary

Sygnity report on operations, calendar 2024 ↗

Report on the Operations of the Sygnity Group and Sygnity S.A..pdf: PDF p.25 sales by sector; pp.32-34 contracts (Ministry of Family, Poczta Polska, Solidarity Shield, CSIRE); p.39 M&A strategy; p.55 competition risk.

Published Apr 30, 2025 · Reviewed Nov 3, 2026
primary

Act on Public Offering (Dz.U.2025.592 consolidated): arts. 73, 79, 82, 83, 91 ↗

Art.73(1) mandatory tender above 50%; art.79(1)-(3b) minimum price: 3- and 6-month VWAP, highest price in 12 months, fair value by an audit firm if illiquid; art.82 squeeze-out at 95%; art.83 sell-out at 95%; art.91(3),(5) delisting by 9/10 of votes cast with half the capital present, after a tender for all remaining shares. Text in force on 3 Nov 2026.

Reviewed Nov 3, 2026
secondary

ITwiz: Comarch sells its HIS segment to Sygnity ↗

Price about PLN28m; Comarch e-health revenue about PLN50m in 2024 (-40% on 2023); Asseco healthcare PLN217m; PLN3bn of KPO funds for hospital digitization in Sept 2025.

Published Oct 3, 2025 · Reviewed Nov 3, 2026
primary

Sygnity nine-month 2026 consolidated and separate statements (Polish original) ↗

Polish original, 48 pages, PLN thousand. Printed pp.8-11 consolidated statements; p.17 revenue/timing/costs; pp.18-20 finance income and tax; pp.25-34 cash, shares, provisions, payables, related parties, contingencies, post-period g.on closing; pp.36-42 commentary and holdings; pp.45-48 parent statements. No English version was posted at review time (EN path returned 404).

Published Nov 10, 2026 · Reviewed Nov 10, 2026